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Privacy, Children, and Their Parents:
Reflections On and Beyond the Supreme
Court's Approach
Robert B. Keiter*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between parents and their children, and
the respective rights of each, has recently received considerable attention.' It is not surprising that the judiciary, including
the Supreme Court, has become enmeshed in the thorny dilemmas arising from the often competing claims of family mem2
bers to the protection of state laws and the Constitution.
Judicial and legislative extension of the principle of individual
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Wyoming. I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of my colleagues, Jackson Battle, Mary Blackstone,
and Gerald Gallivan, who commented on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. A 1980 White House Conference on Families explored methods to make
public and private policies more responsive to family needs. See NEWSWEEK,
Jan. 28, 1980, at 78; NEWSWEEK, June 16, 1980, at 31. The 1980 Republican Party
Platform contained several provisions described as "profamily" and designed to
strengthen the family. See CONG. DIG., Oct. 1980, at 231. Several national news
magazines have recently published articles on the subject of the American family. See NEWSWEEK, May 15, 1978, at 63; TIME, May 22, 1978, at 68; U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, June 16, 1980, at 51. See also COMMONWEAL, Aug. 31, 1979, at
462; CURRENT, Feb. 1977, at 24. Several legal commentators have recently addressed issues involving parent-child rights. See Burt, The Constitutionof the
Family, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 329; Garvey, Child, Paren4 State, and the Due Process Clause: An Essay on the Supreme Court's Recent Work, 51 S. CAT. L REv.
769 (1978); Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some
Reservations About Abandoning Youth to their "Rights," 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv.
605; Richards, The Individua4 the Family and the Constitution: A Jurisprudential Perspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1980); Watson, Children, Families and
Courts: Before the Best Interestsof the Child arid Parham v. J.R., 66 VA. L. REv.
653 (1980); Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1156 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. See generally
G. GUNTHER,CoNSTrrUrONAL LAW 629-41 (10th ed. 1980).
2. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (child's challenge to state
parental consent requirement preceding an abortion for child); Doe v. Irwin,
615 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 829 (1980) (parental challenge to
local clinic's distribution of contraceptives to minors without parental notification); I.L. v. Matheson, 604 P.2d 907 (Utah 1979), affd, 450 U.S. 398 (1981)
(child's challenge to state parental notification requirement before child can receive an abortion).
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autonomy to children 3 has eroded the tradition of parental control and responsibility for children that is broadly reflected in a
variety of state laws and reinforced by venerable Supreme
Court precedent. 4 Family strife, consequently, is no longer confined to the home, and the courts have increasingly found
themselves the unlikely arbiter in reconciling the divergent
rights claimed by children and their parents which threaten
conflict within the family.
Absent parental abuse or neglect, the judiciary has traditionally limited its involvement in the parent-child relationship.5 The Supreme Court's recent extension of constitutional
protection to children as individuals,6 and its subsequent recognition of their right to privacy, 7 has, however, assured the
Court of the eventual task of reconciling the rights and interests asserted by children in actual or potential conflict with
those of their parents. The claimed right of a child to privacy in
individual matters inevitably clashes with the longstanding parental right of authority in directing the child's life, including
involvement in sensitive and intimate matters affecting the

youngster.
The dilemma has presented itself in the judicial forum
3. The courts have recognized that children individually may claim constitutional protection tantamount to a right of privacy. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U. S. 678 (1977) (plurality opinion) (right of privacy
regarding use of contraceptives); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976) (right of privacy regarding abortion); T.R v. Jones, 425 F. Supp. 873 (D.
Utah 1975), affd on other grounds, 425 U.S. 986 (1976) (right of privacy regarding access to contraceptives).
A variety of statutes demonstrates state legislative support for the proposition that children have the authority to act independently of their parents. See,
e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, § 4504 (1980) (minor may receive birth control devices and treatment for venereal disease without parental notice); MINN. STAT.
§ 144.341 - .347 (1980) (child may consent to medical treatment); MIss. CODE
ANN. § 41-41-3(h) (1972) (any child may consent to surgical or medical treatment if he or she can understand and appreciate the consequences).
4. For instance, most states by statute or court decision provide that parents are responsible for their children. See, e.g., Porter v. Powell, 79 Iowa 151,
44 N.W. 285 (1890); CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 196, 196a (West 1980). See also 1 W.
BLAcKsToNE, COMMENTARIES* 447; G. CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS §§ 38, 43
(1954). Constitutional support for the principle of parental authority is generally traced to two cases decided in the 1920s. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). See also
text accompanying notes 163-75 infra.
5. See Geiser, The Rights of Children, 28 HASTINGS L. J. 1027, 1032 (1977);
Hafen, supra note 1, at 629.
6. See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31-57 (1967).
7. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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when children or their representatives have challenged on constitutional grounds state legislative schemes recognizing and
reinforcing seemingly traditional parental child rearing prerogatives.8 The first of these cases to command the Supreme
Court's attention was Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,9 a 1976
case that raised the question of the constitutionality of a Missouri law requiring parental consent before a minor child could
obtain an abortion. The asserted privacy interest advanced on
behalf of pregnant minors was clear in view of the Court's Roe
v. Wadel 0 decision; on the other hand, the parental interest in
matters affecting the child was equally evident, resting ultimately on fifty-year-old constitutional doctrine establishing parental responsibility in child rearing matters." One year later,
2 the Court rein Carey v. Population Services International,1
viewed the constitutionality of a New York statute prohibiting
the distribution of nonhazardous contraceptive devices to minors. During the 1979 term, the Court, in Bellotti v. Baird,13 returned to the question of parental consent as a prerequisite to
a minor's abortion, and also in that year the Court addressed
the issue of parents' rights to commit their children to state
mental institutions in Parhamv. J.R. 14 Most recently, in H.L. v.
Matheson,'5 the Court addressed the validity of a Utah statute
requiring prior parental notification in the case of a minor seeking an abortion. The voting alliances and numerous opinions
generated by these controversies reveal the difficulty faced by
the Court in applying constitutional principles, recently
evolved under due process doctrine, to the family. 16 Although
8. The states, not the federal government, have traditionally assumed responsibility for regulating family and domestic relations, relying upon their police power and their parens patriae authority. See DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351
U.S. 570, 580 (1956); Developments, supra note 1, at 1198.
9. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See text accompanying note 32 infra.
11. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
12. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
13. 443 U.S. 622 (1979). This Bellotti decision actually represented the second time that the Court had rendered a decision in litigation questioning the
constitutionality of a 1974 Massachusetts abortion statute. The Court had previously remanded the case to the district court. Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132
(1976). For a full description of the Bellotti v. Baird litigation history, see note
78 infra.
14. 442 U.S. 584 (1979). See also Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 442 U.S. 640 (1979).
15. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
16. For instance, in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), Justice Powell authored the Court's plurality opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Stewart and Rehnquist joined. Justice Rehnquist also separately concurred,
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the Court has sought to accommodate the competing interests
of parent and child, its various prevailing opinions present inconsistent rationales, and thus provide inadequate guidance for
handling future controversies in this area. Furthermore, the
Court may have unduly polarized the family unit into competing factions and undervalued a critical interest-the preservation of family stability and harmony.
Judging from the Court's frequent opportunities to resolve
the constitutional problems posed by parental consent or notification statutes in areas infringing upon a child's privacy interests,17 and judging from the incidence of similar litigation in
the lower courts,18 the states will very likely continue to reinforce legislatively the parental role. The litigation itself indicates that children will increasingly resort to the courts to
challenge state-enforced parental involvement that intrudes
upon the right to privacy they claim in sensitive and critical areas of their own lives. Although the Court may not be particularly well suited as an institution to resolve these delicate
matters,19 it has spawned the controversy by recognizing that
children possess constitutional rights. Thus far it has not
avoided the difficult issues which have ensued. It is appropriate, therefore, to examine the Court's involvement in this area
with a goal of articulating an analytical framework which might
successfully reconcile the competing interests and be capable
of broad application.
This Article summarizes the doctrinal development of the
constitutional right of privacy, and attempts to describe the
current dimensions of that right as it relates to individual autonomy and to children. Central to this undertaking is a critical
examination of the Bellotti, Matheson, and Parham decisions
expressing his willingness to reconsider in its entirety the question of a minor's
abortion rights. Id. at 651-52 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun joined Justice Stevens in a separate concurring opinion. Id. at 652 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice White dissented. Id. at 656 (White, J., dissenting). See also H.L v. Matheson, 450 U.S.
398 (1981) (four separate opinions with three Justices concurring and three
Justices dissenting); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (six
separate opinions with three Justices concurring in the result and two Justices

dissenting).
17. See cases cited in text accompanying notes 9-15 supra.
18. See, e.g., Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
829 (1981); Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 479 F.
Supp. 1172 (N.D. Ohio 1979); Women's Community Health Center, Inc. v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542 (D. Me. 1979).
19. See Parham v. JR., 442 U.S. 584, 608 n.16 (1979); J. GoLDSTEIN, A. FREuD
& A. SOLNrr, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 12 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS].
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and their historic predecessors. Then, since present dilemmas
in this area evolve from state efforts to regulate the behavior of
children through legislative support for parental authority, the
Article examines the constitutional underpinnings of the parental responsibility doctrine, and also reviews other bases for
state legislative authority over family matters. Finally, the Article proposes that an interest analysis is a viable approach for
constitutional review of state legislative efforts affecting parentchild relations in which the potential for conflict is evident
given the child's claim of privacy.
II. PRIVACY AND THE CHILD
Substantive due process as a constitutional concept is not
new. The Court, however, has recently resurrected doctrines,
discredited with the demise of the Lochner era,2 0 to infuse the
fourteenth amendment with newfound significance. 2 1 Despite
criticism that it has manufactured constitutional rights,22 the
Court appears firmly committed to its present course of drawing upon tradition and consensus to extract from the due pro23
cess clause the dimensions of an individual right to privacy.
The Court has characterized this individual privacy right as a
fundamental right entitled to strict judicial protection. 24 By
adopting this characterization, the Court has engrafted equal
protection principles onto the due process clause to provide a
standard for measuring both the importance of state interests
underlying statutory provisions infringing upon an individual's
privacy and the narrowness of the means chosen to implement
20. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner invalidated a
state statute limiting the number of hours a baker could work as an arbitrary
and unnecessary interference with the liberty to contract. Id. at 64. The notion
that the Court could impose its own ideas on a state's economic policy was
later repudiated. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
21. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
22. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 514 (Black, J., dissenting);
Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L. J.920,
932 (1973); Epstein, Substantive Due Process By Any OtherName: The Abortion
Cases, 1973 Su-p. CT. REV. 159, 170.
23. See Ely, Foreward: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HAv.L
REV. 1, 10, 39, 43 (1978); Developments, supra note 1, at 1177-83. For the purposes of consistency and brevity, this Article adopts the Court's label and refers to those fundamental rights which the Court has recognized and accorded

extraordinary constitutional protection under the due process clause as the
right of privacy. See text accompanying notes 2647 infra.
24. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485 (1965).
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those interests. 25
A.

PRIVACY GENERALLY

Contemporary recognition of a right to privacy is generally
traced to the Court's Griswold v. Connecticut2 6 decision which
invalidated a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married couples. 27 Although the majority Justices
offered several different theories for the origin of the individual
right implicated in Griswold,28 all agreed on the basic principle
that the Constitution accords a right of privacy to married
couples making childbearing decisions, which Connecticut
could not infringe through its sweeping prohibition on the use
of contraceptives. 2 9 The Court could have limited Griswold to
its facts, but subsequently made it clear in Eisenstadt v.
Baird3O that the right of privacy extended beyond the marital
relationship to single adults who sought access to nonhazardous contraceptives. The Court based its decision in Eisenstadt
on the equal protection clause and invalidated a Massachusetts
law limiting a single adult's access to contraceptives by broadly
asserting that "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child."31 One year later, in Roe v. Wade, seven members of
the Court found a fundamental right of privacy in the due process clause when an adult woman sought to abort an unwanted
pregnancy. 32 They proceeded to extend that right to protect a
pregnant woman's abortion decision against any state restric25. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) with Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
26. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
27. The Court had alluded to the right of privacy in prior decisions, but it
had not stated the concept with as much clarity as it did in the Griswold decision. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
28. Justice Douglas in his opinion for the Court found the right of privacy
grounded in the penumbra of rights surrounding the Bill of Rights. 381 U.S. at
484. Justice Goldberg relied upon the ninth and fourteenth amendments as the
source of the right of privacy. Id. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justices
Harlan and White found the right of privacy in the fourteenth amendment due
process clause. Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 502
(White, J., concurring in the judgment).
29. 381 U.S. at 485, 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring); id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 502 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
30. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
31. Id. at 453.
32. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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tions during the first trimester of her pregnancy, and to protect
her against any state regulation unrelated to her health during
the ensuing trimester. 33 The Roe decision recognized that, at
least to some extent, individual decisions concerning marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing,
and education implicated fundamental privacy rights.34 Roe
also made it clear that once state legislative action infringed on
a fundamental right, the infringement would withstand constitutional scrutiny only if the state could demonstrate that a
compelling interest supported the legislative scheme and that
the means chosen for the accomplishment of those objectives
were the narrowest possible. 35 Precedent from parallel developments in equal protection law indicates that when courts apply this strict judicial scrutiny to legislative action, they
36
inevitably invalidate the statute.
Since Roe v. Wade, the Court has elaborated on the doctrine of privacy, but it has been reluctant to expand the concept
37
to embrace any notion of unbounded personal autonomy.
Most of the claims before the Court have involved matters con39
cerning familial relationships, 38 sexual privacy, or abortion,40
and the Court has carefully examined precedent and societal
33. Id. at 163.
34. Id. at 152-53.
35. Id. at 155.
36. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). See also Gunther, Forword:
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a ChangingCourt: A Modelfor Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
37. See Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 436 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Pa.
1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1374 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978) (privacy
argument rejected in employment dismissal based upon employee's adulterous
living arrangement and birth of child out of wedlock). Cf. Kelley v. Johnson,
425 U.S. 238 (1976) (privacy argument not decided in policeman's unsuccessful
challenge to hair length regulation). Commentators have argued since the Roe
v. Wade decision that the constitutional right of privacy should properly include an individual's right to complete personal autonomy, so long as it does
not harm others. The genesis for this view is John Stewart Mill's classic work,
ON LIBERTY (J.W. Parker & Son, London 1859). See Eichbaum, Towards an Autonomy-Based Theory of ConstitutionalPrivacy: Beyond the Ideology of Familial Privacy, 14 HAnv. C.R.-C.L L REV. 361 (1979); Richards, Sexual Autonomy
and the ConstitutionalRight to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and
the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L. J. 957 (1979).
38. Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (foster family relationship); Moore
v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (extended family relationship).
39. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (sale and distribution of nonhazardous contraceptives); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F.
Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three judge court), affld mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976)
(state criminal sodomy statute).
40. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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tradition to identify the asserted privacy interest. 41 In Whalen
v. Roe, 42 however, the Court unanimously endorsed Justice
Stevens's abstract formulation of the privacy interest allegedly
infringed by New York's computerized record keeping scheme
for prescriptions of legal, dangerous drugs. He stated that the
privacy right included both an "individual interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters" 43 and an "interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions." 4 4 This
formulation of the privacy right suggests its extension beyond
the relatively narrow class of interests previously found to be
protected. 45 It remains unclear, however, exactly which "personal matters" or "important decisions" implicate fundamental
rights. It is probably correct to conclude that the interests previously identified by the Court-childbearing, contraception,
marriage, child rearing, and related matters-fall within these
categories. But Whalen seems to extend these categories to
cover individual privacy in sensitive medical treatment matters
and their disclosure. Despite the willingness of all of the Justices to join Justice Stevens's Whalen opinion and its privacy
formula, the Court's subsequent decisions have not extended
the scope of the privacy right beyond the traditionally recognized privacy realms. 46 For example, in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney,47 which involved a homosexual's challenge
to Virginia's criminal sodomy statute, the Court summarily af41. See, e.g., Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816, 842-47 (1977); Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). Commentators have asserted that recognition of a privacy right depends upon whether the asserted right is consistent
with popular morality and widely accepted among the populace. Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Functionof Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 689 (1976). Cf. Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three judge court), aO d mer., 425
U.S. 901 (1976) (privacy argument rejected in homosexual's challenge to state
criminal sodomy statute). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrruTIONAL
LAw 893-96 (1978).
42. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
43. Id. at 599.
44. Id. at 599-600.
45. See L. TRIBE, supra note 41, at 886.
46. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374 (1978). It is likely, however, that the Court will soon confront a nontraditional privacy claim arising from mental patients' litigation asserting a liberty interest in the right of bodily privacy in order to prevent the state from
administering antipsychotic medication to them without procedural due process protections. See Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. granted,
101 S. Ct. 1972 (1981).
47. 425 U.S. 901 (1976). See also Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 436
F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Pa. 1977), affid, 578 F.2d 1374 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1052 (1978).
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firmed a lower court decision denying constitutional protection
to his nontraditional privacy claim.
The Court, therefore, has chosen to rely upon traditional
values to confine the scope of privacy to a generally narrow
class of activities widely accepted as aspects of individual liberty under our constitutional scheme. The Court has carefully
limited Whalen's broader formulation of these interests to the
facts of that case and to those interests already recognized in
prior decisions.

B. CHILDREN AND PRIVACY-EARLY CASES
The Supreme Court's extension of privacy rights to children has been a relatively recent development. The Court's
1967 In re Gault48 decision is generally regarded as the
landmark case in establishing the principle that constitutional
protection extends to children as well as to adults. Specifically,
the Court held that due process entitles children to basic procedural protections in juvenile delinquency proceedings. 49 In
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,5 0 however, the Court signalled its
reluctance to extend to children charged with delinquency the
full gamut of individual constitutional protections available to
adults charged with criminal violations by refusing to find a
right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings. But in Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District5 ' the Court
found that the first amendment protected school children's
right to free speech and prohibited their suspension from
school simply because the children took a then unpopular position and declared their opposition to the Viet Nam War.5 2 A
characteristic of these decisions is the Court's apparent willingness to extend some constitutional protection to children, qualified by a constant reminder that the rights available to
children are not commensurate with those available to adults
48. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
49. These protections include notice, the right to counsel, the right to confront and to cross-examine witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 31-57. Subsequent cases extended additional constitutional
safeguards to juveniles in delinquency proceedings, including the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of guilt, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), and the prohibition against double jeopardy, Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
50. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
51. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
52. See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (high school students entitled to informal hearing before suspension). But see Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651 (1977) (prior procedural protections not required when school children

face corporal punishment).
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in similar situations. 53 Another common feature of these cases

is that the parent has supported the child in asserting a claim
to constitutional protection against an allegedly overreaching
state. 54
In 1976, the Court was confronted for the first time with the
issue of whether to extend constitutional protection to children
when there is no parental support for the claim and parental
opposition might be expected. In Planned Parenthoodv. Danforth, a Missouri statute assertedly breached the children's
right to privacy by requiring parental consent before an unmarried pregnant minor could obtain an abortion. 55 In holding that
the state could not delegate the authority to decide whether a
minor should abort her pregnancy to a third party, even her
parents, the Court56 recognized that minors could claim privacy
rights similar to those available to adults under the due process
clause, at least when abortion was the issue.5 7 Although the
53. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) ('The Court has
refrained, in the cases heretofore decided from taking the easy way with a flat
holding that all rights constitutionally assured for the adult accused are to be
imposed upon the state juvenile proceeding."). See also Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
54 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969) (three suspended school children initiated the litigation
through their parents).
55. 428 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1976). On the same day the Court decided Planned
Parenthood, it disposed of the appeal in Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976), a
Massachusetts case raising constitutional questions regarding a minores right to
an abortion, by remanding it to the federal district court for certification of
questions to the state supreme court. See note 78 infra, for a comprehensive
history of the Bellotti litigation.
56. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stewart, and Powell joined Justice Blackmun's majority opinion. Justices Stewart and Powell, however, separately concurred in an opinion by Justice Stewart, expressing their view that the
Missouri statute's constitutional inadequacy was its absolute requirement of
parental consent, but that a statute which encouraged parental consultation in
the case of a minor seeking an abortion was permissible. 428 U.S. at 90-91
(Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart's conclusion that a minor child seeking an abortion through an abortion clinic was unlikely to receive very thorough or satisfactory counseling from the clinic's medical staff seemed critical to
this conclusion. Id. at 901 n.2. See the decision in the companion case of Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976). Chief Justice Burger and Justices White
and Rehnquist dissented from the Court's parental consent holding, arguing
that the states had traditionally sought to protect minor children from improvident decisions through parental consent requirements. 428 U.S. at 92, 95
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens also dissented from the Court's parental consent holding, asserting that a state legislature may reasonably conclude that the importance of the abortion decision
justified a requirement of parental consent on the presumption that most parents are primarily interested in their child's welfare. Id. at 101, 103-04 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57. 428 U.S. at 74-75. While holding that the Constitution entitled minors to
some degree of privacy protection, Justice Blackmun also recognized that the
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Court recognized that the state enjoyed greater latitude in legislatively controlling the activities of children, it rejected Missouri's contention that the consent provision strengthened
family bonds and reinforced parental authority.5 S The Court
could find no connection between Missouri's asserted interests
and the consent provision; to the contrary, the Court anticipated that the consent provision would likely undermine familial harmony. 59 Planned Parenthood thus provided
constitutional protection for children under substantive due
process principles, and it signalled the importance which the
Court attached to the privacy right in the case of abortion. Furthermore, in Planned Parenthood the Court permitted a third
party, not a parent, to assert a constitutional claim on a child's
behalf,60 thereby assuring future litigation to vindicate unpopular children's rights, notwithstanding parental objection. The
four separate opinions in Planned Parenthood, including four
dissents from the parental consent holding, did not clearly resolve, however, the question of the extent to which the state
could involve parents in a child's abortion decision. Nor did it
definitively establish the scope of a child's privacy rights or the
applicable scrutiny under which to test legislation implicating
these rights.
One term later, in Carey v. Population Services International, the Court ruled on the constitutionality of a New York
statute that broadly restricted the distribution of nonprescription contraceptives, and specifically prohibited their distribution to minors under the age of sixteen.61 The Court granted
third party standing to the organizational plaintiff, a commercial distributor of contraceptive devices, to litigate the various
claims, including those advanced on behalf of minors under age
sixteen.62 Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality,63 concluded
state had greater authority to regulate a child's activities than an adult's, implying that a child's constitutional rights are not equivalent to those of an adult.

Id. at 74.
58. Id. at 75.
59. Id.
60. A nonprofit Missouri corporation, two doctors who represented a class
of physicians desiring to perform abortions, and a class of patients seeking ter-

mination of their pregnancies through abortion commenced the litigation. Id.
at 56-57.
61. 431 U.S. 678, 681 (1977).
62. The Court held that Population Planning Association, Inc., a corporation engaged in the mail-order retail sale of nonmedical contraceptives, had
standing to litigate the constitutionality of the New York statutes on behalf of
itself and its customers. Id. at 682-83. See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976).

63. Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun joined Justice Brennan in
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that the New York scheme implicated the privacy right of minors. 64 He cited Planned Parenthoodfor the proposition that a
minor could claim a right of privacy in decisions affecting procreation, and, analogizing to the abortion question presented
there, he found the issue foreclosed in favor of the minor's
claim.65 Justice Brennan suggested that heightened judicial
scrutiny was the appropriate standard to apply in testing the
challenged statute. 66 He specifically rejected application of the
more stringent compelling state interest standard, which would
govern a similar situation involving an adult, because of the
state's greater latitude in regulating the conduct of children
and the presumed diminished capacity of children to make important decisions. 67 Justice Brennan could find no substantial
state interest in health or safety promoted by the New York
statute, particularly because the Court in Planned Parenthood
had found that these interests were insubstantial when balanced against a minor's right to an abortion.68 Responding to
the state's only other proffered objective--discouraging sexual
promiscuity among the young-he found that the statute prescribed arbitrary and irrational means for the accomplishment
of this goal.6 9 There was no evidence that the proscription on
the distribution of contraceptives achieved this goal, and it actually portended severe and unwarranted punishment in the
70
form of unwanted pregnancies.
Three Justices, who otherwise concurred in the Carey
holding, criticized the plurality's conclusion that heightened judicial scrutiny was the applicable standard for measuring the
state's interests in regulating a minor's access to contraceptive
devices. Justices White, Powell, and Stevens, writing separately, suggested that any scrutiny exceeding the traditional rational basis standard was inappropriate for cases involving
his opinion for the Court. Justices Stevens, Powell, and White agreed with the
Court's judgment, but they objected to Justice Brennan's treatment of the constitutional question posed by New York's restriction on the distribution of contraceptives to minors, and each filed a separate concurring opinion. Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented.
64. 431 U.S. at 693.
65. Id. at 693-94.
66. Id. at 693. Justice Brennan specifically wrote that "[s]tate restrictions

inhibiting privacy rights of minors are valid only if they serve 'any significant
state interest... that is not present in the case of an adult."' Id. (citation
omitted).

67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 693 n.15.
Id. at 694.
Id. at 696.
Id. at 695.
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minors. In his lengthy concurrence, Justice Powell argued that
the courts traditionally had granted considerable authority to
the state in legislating with respect to children, given the
state's interest in guarding their welfare and assuring their
growth into free and independent citizens. 7 1 Justice Powell felt
that the appropriate standard for judging the law's constitutionality as applied to minors was whether it rationally served valid
state interests. 7 2 He noted that since New York had granted females aged 14 to 16 the right to marry, the state evidently presumed that they were mature enough to make decisions
concerning sex and procreation.7 3 Hence, the challenged statute unconstitutionally infringed upon their privacy rights.
More significantly, he found that the statute also infringed
upon parental child rearing rights and that the asserted state
interests failed to justify this interference with the important
parental responsibility of providing guidance to children on
sexual matters.7 4 Indeed, Justice Powell's dictum indicated approval of state legislation that promoted parental responsibility
over the private lives of children by suggesting that a state requirement of parental consultation before a minor might engage in sexual activities or secure an abortion would be
constitutionally permissible.7 5 Although Justice Powell agreed
that the New York statute was invalid, his opinion reflected a
fundamental philosophical difference between him and the plurality in reconciling the potentially competing claims of children and their parents to the protection of the Constitution
when children face important decisions about sex and
childbearing.
Justices White and Stevens, in their own concurrences,
were similarly unable to find that the state's prohibition against
a minor's access to contraceptives implicated the minor's constitutional right to privacy. Both agreed that any claim that mi71. Id. at 705-07 (Powell, J., concurring).
In addition to striking down the New York statutory ban on the distribution
of contraceptives to minors, the Court in Carey also invalidated the portion of
the statute prohibiting the distribution of nonmedical contraceptives to adults
except through licensed pharmacists. Id. at 686-91. Justice Powell also disagreed with this aspect of the decision, objecting to what he perceived as the
unwarranted extension of the Court's prior privacy decisions to embrace a fundamental right to sexual freedom, which subjected state regulation in this area
to review under the compelling state interest standard. Id. at 703-05 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
72. Id. at 707.
73. Id. at 707-08.
74. Id. at 708-10.
75. Id. at 709-10.
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nors possessed a constitutional right to use contraceptives over
76
the objection of their parents and the state was ",frivolous."
They agreed with Justice Brennan, however, that the means
New York had chosen to accomplish its goal of deterring youthful promiscuity were irrational, and, therefore, under traditional due process doctrine the legislation failed to satisfy the
77
rational basis constitutional standard.
C.

BELLOTTI v. BAIRD

The Court's recent decision in Bellotti v. Baird78 is its most
comprehensive attempt to define the scope of a minor's privacy
right in making an abortion decision. The plaintiff in Bellotti
questioned the constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute that
required parental consent before a minor could obtain an abortion, and provided for judicial review of a parental decision to
deny permission.7 9 Justice Powell, writing for a plurality of
four Justices which included Justice Rehnquist,8 0 delivered the
Court's opinion upholding the district court's determination
76. Id. at 703 (White, J., concurring); id. at 713 (Stevens, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 702 (White, J., concurring); id. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring).
78. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
The Bellotti litigation has a lengthy history. A three-judge federal court initially invalidated the statute. 393 F. Supp. 847 (D. Mass. 1975). On appeal, the
United States Supreme Court concluded that the district court should have abstained and certified questions concerning interpretation of the statute to the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in an effort to avoid a decision on the
constitutional issues. 428 U.S. 132 (1976). On remand, the district court certified questions to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 443 U.S. 622,
629 n.9 (1979). The Supreme Judicial Court proceeded to interpret the statute,
in part, as requiring a minor to first seek parental consent in all cases in which
she sought an abortion, while permitting judicial review of a parental refusal
based upon the "best interests of the minor" standard without regard to her
maturity or her independent decision making capacity. 371 Mass. 741, 360 N.E.
2d 288 (1977). After reviewing the newly interpreted law, the district court
again invalidated it on constitutional grounds, 450 F. Supp. 997 (D. Mass. 1978),
and the second appeal to the United States Supreme Court ensued.
79. 443 U.S. at 134-35.
80. Joining Justice Powell's plurality opinion for the Court were Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist. Justice White dissented and
reiterated his view that parental involvement in a minor child's abortion decision was constitutionally permissible. 443 U.S. at 656. See Planned Parenthood
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 94 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist's
decision to cast his vote with the plurality is significant, because his separate
concurrence indicates his basic dissatisfaction with the Court's holding:
At such time as this Court is willing to reconsider its earlier decision in
Planned Parenthood ... in which I joined the opinion of Mr. Justice
White, dissenting in part, I shall be more than willing to participate in
that task. But unless and until that time comes, literally thousands of
judges cannot be left with nothing more than the guidance offered by a
truly fragmented holding of this Court.
443 U.S. at 651-52 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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that the statute unconstitutionally restricted the abortion rights
of minors.
Justice Powell, acknowledging that the Constitution protects children as individuals, asserted that the Court could not
uncritically extend to minors the constitutional guarantees
available to adults; rather, the Court would apply constitutional
principles "with sensitivity and flexibility to the special needs
of parents and children."81 Relying upon the Court's previous
decisions concerning children, Justice Powell advanced three
reasons in support of the proposition that only limited constitutional protection was available to minors: their vulnerability;
their inability to reach important decisions in a mature, reflective manner; and the critical role of their parents in child rearing.82 He concluded that the state should support parents and
others responsible for children through laws designed to assist
them in fufilling their responsibilities, 83 which typically include parental notification and consent requirements governing
a child's important decisions. Justice Powell, however, distinguished a minor's abortion decision from other important decisions she might face during her childhood, because an abortion
requires prompt action before it becomes too late to abort, and
it portends severe and grave long-term consequences. 84 Drawing upon the PlannedParenthoodprinciple that a possibly arbitrary third-party veto is unacceptable in the abortion context,
he concluded that, rather than seek parental consent for an
abortion, a pregnant minor could request consent from a court
or a designated administrative official. 85 The court would decide whether the minor was sufficiently mature and capable of
reaching an independent decision on the matter; if so, she
could seek an abortion without further judicial or parental involvement. 86 If she lacked the capacity to make this important
decision, the court would determine whether an abortion would
be in her best interest.8 7 Using the best interests standard, the
court could authorize the abortion without parental involvement, it could require parental consultation, or it could deny
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 634 (Powell, J., concurring).
at 639.
at 642-43.
at 643. Notably, Justice Powell did not seem to envision the alterna-

tive judicial or administrative proceeding as requiring a formal, adversarial proceeding. Id at 643 n.22.
86. Id. at 647.
87. Id. at 647-48.
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the minor's request for an abortion. 88 The proceedings would
be prompt and anonymous, and the minor could obtain an ex89
pedited appeal of an adverse decision.
Applying his proposed scheme to the Massachusetts statute, Justice Powell discerned two deficiencies which placed an
undue burden upon a minor's abortion right. First, the statute
required initial parental consultation before a minor could seek
judicial relief entitling her to an abortion.90 Justice Powell recognized that parents might exert considerable pressure on a
minor, effectively preventing her from requesting consent from
a court, particularly if her parents held strong views against
abortion. He concluded that the Constitution required direct
access to the courts notwithstanding the recognized parental
interest in the matter and the state's interest in a familial
rather than judicial resolution of the question. 9 1 Second, the
statute permitted a court to make an independent determination of the minor's best interests regardless of her competency
to reach a mature decision concerning an abortion. This provision unduly burdened the right of a mature minor to seek an
abortion, because the rationale for heightened governmental
solicitude for her as a minor was no longer relevant in view of
92
her maturity.
Three Justices joined Justice Steven's separate concurring
opinion in which he objected to the advisory nature of the plurality's opinion. 93 Justice Stevens concluded that the Court's
earlier decisions in Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth effectively resolved the questions presented by Bellotti.94 He argued that the unambiguous conclusion in Planned
Parenthood,that the Constitution precluded the possibility of a
third-party veto over a woman's abortion decision, controlled
Bellotti, because the statute provided for either a possible parental or judicial veto of a minor's abortion decision regardless
of her maturity or competence.9 5 Finding the Whalen v. Roe
two-pronged privacy formulation 9 6 fully applicable to the privacy interests involved in a minor's abortion decision, Justice
88. Id. at 648.
89. Id. at 644.
90. Id. at 646.
91. Id. at 648.
92. Id. at 650.
93. Id. at 652, 656 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun joined Justice Stevens.
94. Id. at 652-53.
95. Id. at 654.
96. See note 43-44 supra and accompanying text.
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Stevens stated: "It is inherent in the right to make the abortion
decision that the right may be exercised without public scrutiny and in defiance of the contrary opinion of the sovereign or
other third parties."9 7 Justice Stevens further criticized the plurality for erecting additional hurdles for the minor seeking an
abortion-the necessity of securing access to a court and then
the prospect of facing a judge who lacked standards to guide
his or her decision.9 8 Significantly, Justice Stevens asserted
that the question of whether a state statute providing for parental notification of a minor's abortion decision without a veto
provision was constitutional remained unanswered. 99
In many respects the Bellotti opinion may have produced
more questions than it resolved in its attempt to reconcile the
competing interests. Although this is not surprising in view of
the delicate inquiry undertaken by the Court, it is nevertheless
troubling, because the Court will likely face similar issues in
which children and their parents disagree over matters significantly affecting the child's life and which raise a child's claim
for constitutional protection. It is notable that the plurality
never directly addressed the nature or scope of the child's privacy right. By simply relying upon the abortion right recognized in Roe v. Wade, the plurality seemed unwilling to extend
constitutional privacy protection to minors outside the context
of abortion.100 Yet its conclusion about the significance of the
abortion decision belies this narrow interpretation: "In sum,
there are few situations in which denying a minor the right to
make an important decision will have consequences so grave
and indelible."0l The plurality seemed to recognize the possibility that nonabortion decisions confronting a minor may be
97.

443 U.S. at 655 (Stevens, J., concurring).

98. Id.
99. Id. at 654 n.1. In his dissent, Justice White stated: "Until now, I would
have thought inconceivable a holding that the United States Constitution forbids even notice to parents when their minor child who seeks surgery objects
to such notice and is able to convince a judge that the parents should be denied
participation in the decision." Id. at 657 (White, J., dissenting).
100. Justice Powell's statement that "[t]he abortion decision differs in important ways from other decisions that may be made during minority" suggests
his unwillingness to extend privacy rights to minors beyond this limited situation. Id. at 642 (Powell, J., concurring). The views expressed by Justice Powell
in his concurring opinion in Carey v. PopulationServices Internationalfurther
support this conclusion. 431 U.S. 678, 703 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring). First,
he asserted that the Griswold-Roe line of cases did not support the extension
of privacy principles to all aspects of state regulation implicating sexual freedom. Id. at 705. Second, he pointed out that the state had considerable latitude
in regulating children because of their presumed diminished capacity. Id.
101. 443 U.S. at 642.
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sufficiently important, presumably in view of a critical time element or potentially severe consequences, to warrant constitutional privacy protection.102 If the Court intended to provide
this degree of flexibility in its holding, we are left to speculate
about which nonabortion decisions the Court intends to protect. It is reasonable to conclude that privacy protection for minors' nonabortion decisions will not extend beyond those
decisions traditionally given protection for adults. Of course, if
the status of youth aggravates either the factor of timeliness or
grave consequences, the Court might logically extend privacy
protection to areas in which similar protection is unavailable to
03
adults.1
The failure of the plurality to address directly the degree of
constitutional protection provided to the minors' recognized
privacy interests when they face an abortion decision is more
troublesome. The Court avoided application of the traditional
"ends-means" formula in testing the extent of the state's interest against the invaded right. The explicit balancing which Justice Powell engaged in as he sought to apply constitutional
principles "with sensitivity and flexibility in view of the special
needs of parents and children" suggests an alternative approach to handling the constitutional privacy claims of children. Rather than measuring the state interests reflected in the
Massachusetts statute against the standards of strict or intermediate scrutiny, as the Court had done in Planned
Parenthood and Carey, Justice Powell simply balanced the minor's interest against those of the state, including its vindication of parental prerogatives in child rearing. Although
balancing is not inappropriate in constitutional jurisprudence,104 it is a clear departure from the Court's earlier efforts
in this area, and it provides the lower courts with only limited
102. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
103. Professor Wald lists the following decisions which might confront a
child and which courts might regard as sufficiently important to embrace
within constitutional privacy protection in order to assure autonomy to a child
in resolving the question: whether to have an abortion; to receive drug, alcohol,
or medical care; to go to a certain school or to participate in religious exercises;
to use contraceptives; or to enter a mental hospital. Wald, Children's Rights: A
Frameworkfor Analysis, 12 U. CAi. D. L. REv. 255, 272-73 (1979). In each case
the decision would seem to involve important matters for the child and, given

the child's youthfulness, to require a prompt resolution of the matter. See note
235 infra.
104. See, e.g. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (minor child's liberty interest balanced against parental and governmental interests in due process proceedings); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
503 (1969) (minor's right to free speech balanced against school authorities' discipline and order requirements).

1982]

CHILDREN AND PARENTS

direction in answering other issues involving parents and their
children's claims to privacy protection outside the abortion
context.

D. H.L. v. MATHESON
Notwithstanding Justice Powell's efforts in Bellotti, the
Court's recent decision in H.L. v. MathesonO5 reveals that the
Court has not yet definitively resolved the question of whether
parents can participate in their child's abortion decision when
they do not possess a veto right. Matheson involved a child's
privacy challenge to a Utah statute requiring parental notification in advance of the performance of an abortion on a minor. 0 6 The controversy generated four opinions from the
Court; however, Chief Justice Burger managed to command a
rather tenuous majority for his narrow holding, which sus07
tained the Utah legislation.
Chief Justice Burger rejected the plaintiff's overbreadth argument by carefully excluding from the Court's consideration
those situations which involved emancipated minors, demonstrably mature minors, minors facing emergency medical situations, and minors confronting a hostile home situation. 0 8
105. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
106. The Utah statute provided, in part: "To enable the physician to exercise his best medical judgment [in considering a possible abortion], he shall
...[n]otify, if possible, the parents or guardian of the woman upon whom the
abortion is to be performed, if she is a minor." UTAH CODE AN. § 76-7-304(2)
(1965). The Utah Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the statute
in H.L. v. Matheson, 604 P.2d 907 (Utah 1980).
107. Justices Stewart, White, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined Chief Justice
Burger's majority opinion. Justice Powell separately concurred, and Justice
Stewart joined him. 450 U.S. at 413 (Powell, J., concurring). It may be significant that Justice Stewart joined in Justice Powell's concurrence, because Justice Powell seemed to object to the Court's articulation of the privacy test. See
text accompanying notes 114-16 infra. Without Justice Stewart's support, the
Court's opinion would become a plurality opinion, like the preceding Planned
Parenthood,Carey, and Bellotti decisions. Justice Stevens also separately concurred. Id. at 420 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justices Marshall, Brennan, and
Blackmun dissented. Id. at 425 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
108. 450 U.S. 405-07. The Court specifically found that the plaintiff failed to
allege in her original class action complaint that she was either emancipated or
mature, and it therefore concluded that she lacked standing to argue the interests of emancipated or mature minors even through an overbreadth argument
Id. at 405-06. Likewise, the Court found she could not argue the interests of minors confronted with an emergency medical situation or a hostile home environment. Id. at 407 n.14.
By the time the Court heard the Matheson case, a federal district court in
Utah had ruled that section 76-7-304(2) was inapplicable to emancipated minors. L!R v. Hansen, Civil No. C-80-0078 (D. Utah Feb. 8, 1980). The Supreme
Court also asserted that the statute could be construed to exclude the other
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Although the Chief Justice recognized that the Constitution
protected a mature minor's abortion decision against thirdparty veto, he declined to accord blanket constitutional privacy
protection to minors in plaintiffs position. He found that two
state interests supported the parental notification requirement:
the necessity to protect an immature minor against an improvident decision regarding abortion; and the reinforcement of the
parental role in child rearing matters.109 Chief Justice Burger
variously characterized these interests as "important" or "significant," suggesting that he intended to apply a heightened
level of scrutiny to the statute." 0 The Chief Justice's analysis
of Utah's chosen means, however, is somewhat confusing and
apparently less rigorous. At one point he referred to the notification requirement as "reasonably calculated to protect minors,"'
but he later described the statute as "narrowly
drawn." 112 And the Chief Justice finally stated that "[t] he Constitution does not compel a State to fine-tune its statutes so as
to encourage or facilitate abortions.""3
Justice Powell separately concurred and reiterated his position in Bellotti that a mature minor or a minor whose best interests would not be served by parental notification might
claim constitutional protection against a state notification mandate.11 4 In this case he agreed with Chief Justice Burger that
the plaintiff lacked standing to raise these issues. He asserted,
however, that in resolving abortion issues involving minors,
courts must weigh the various interests of the child, the parent,
groups whose claims the Court refused to acknowledge because the plaintiff
lacked standing. 450 U.S. at 405-07.
109. Id. at 409-10.
110. The Court concluded that the statute served "the important considerations of family integrity and protecting adolescents." Id. at 411. It also asserted

that the statute served a "significant state interest by providing an opportunity
for parents to supply essential medical and other information to a physician."
Id.

111. Id. at 412.
112. Id. at 413. The Court's choice of words in describing the "means" of pa-

rental notification adopted by the Utah legislature is significant because the
Court has regularly used a reasonableness standard in measuring means when

it has purported to apply traditional due process analysis; however, it has used

the narrow means test when it has applied heightened due process scrutiny.
See G. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 540-44. Compare Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489-91 (1953) with Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
499 (1977).

113. 450 U.S. at 413. The Court's assertion that this situation does not require statutory fine tuning is inconsistent with any degree of heightened judicial scrutiny. See G. GuNrMrnz, supra note 1, at 670-78.

114. 450 U.S. at 413-14 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Stewart, a member of

the majority, joined Justice Powell's concurring opinion.
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and the state to ensure flexibility and to avoid rigidity in constitutional doctrine." 5 Given his willingness to carefully weigh
the various interests, Justice Powell's position contrasts with
the majority's position suggesting considerable deference to
state legislative judgments. The potential breadth which courts
might attribute to the majority's language apparently concerned him.
Justice Stevens also separately concurred in the result, expressing his view that the parental notification requirement
was constitutional as applied to the plaintiff and as applied to
emancipated or mature minors seeking an abortion. Justice
Stevens concluded that the state interests asserted by Utah
were fundamental and substantial when compared to the minimal impact which the notification requirement had on a minor's
constitutional rights in this area." 6 Justice Stevens specifically
recognized the state's interest in ensuring that a young woman
receives guidance and consultation in resolving an issue as important as the abortion decision. Regarding parental notification as the means to facilitate this consultation and to
encourage parent-child communication, Justice Stevens argued
7
that parents generally act in their children's best interests."1
Thus, in reaching the broader issues raised by the Matheson
appeal, Justice Stevens indicated his willingness to defer to the
judgment of the Utah legislature and its conjectural assumptions about the impact of the notification requirements on par8
ent-child relations and the integrity of the family."i
In his dissent, Justice Marshall contended that it was appropriate to examine carefully the interests of the child and the
state affected by the legislative notification requirement. In his
view the notification requirement presented a substantial obstacle to the privacy right involved in a minor's decision to seek
an abortion-minors confronted by the prospect of notifying a
nonsupportive family may forego the abortion decision or seek
115. Id. at 418-20. See also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
116. 450 U.S. at 421-23 (Stevens, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 423-24 n.1. See also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979). Justice Stevens also addressed the issue of whether the Utah statute applied to a

mature minor and, if so, the possible impact notification of her parents might
have on her abortion right, by arguing that a minor who was mature enough to
decide to have an abortion very likely was also mature enough to resist contrary parental pressure. 450 U.S. at 425 n.2 (Stevens J., concurring).
118. Justice Steven's statement that "a state legislature may rationally decide" seems to indicate an adoption of traditional due process analysis. Id. at
423-24 n.1. See G. GUNTHER, mupra note 1, at 540-44.
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an illegal abortion. 119 He felt that this possibility impermissibly intruded upon the child's privacy, compelling disclosure of
important personal matters and possibly undermining her abl20
ity to obtain an abortion.1
To sustain this burden upon a minor's privacy right, Justice
Marshall argued that Utah had to establish that the legislation
served "significant" state interests, and that the statutory
scheme represented means "closely tailored" to achieve those
interests.121 He could find nothing in the notification requirement to support Utah's argument that the statute facilitated the
transfer of medical or other information between a child's parents and her physician, because the statute did not impose a
requirement to transfer this information.12 2 He also rejected
Utah's argument that the statute encouraged parent-child consultation, since there was no requirement of timeliness attached to the notification.123 Because notification applied
regardless of the existing parent-child relationship, Justice
Marshall concluded that it was overbroad as a chosen means to
assure consultation. Acknowledging that parental involvement
in a minor's abortion decision was desirable if realistically compatible with the existing home situation, Justice Marshall noted
that many families would not present a supportive environment to a daughter confronting an abortion decision.124 He discounted Utah's argument that the notice requirement
reinforced parental authority and family integrity, reasoning
that a state-imposed notice requirement would not alone alter
or improve a deteriorated home situation, nor the emotional or
psychological bonds existing between family members.125 The
state-mandated notice, he argued, impermissibly inserted the
state into private family matters contrary to the rationale underlying parental authority, 2 6 particularly because the statute
119. 450 U.S. at 437-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 437-38.
121. Id. at 441-42.
122. Id. at 442-43.
123. Id. at 446-47.
124. Id. at 437.
125. Id. at 437 n.22. Although recognizing that most minors facing an abortion decision ideally would consult with their parents, Justice Marshall empha-

sized that such consultation must ultimately depend upon the emotional
attachments within the family itself, and not upon state-mandated legal
obligations.
126. Id. at 447-54. Justice Marshall argued that the rationale of the Supreme
Court's parental authority cases, see notes 163-74 infra and accompanying text,
precluded unjustified state intrusion, such as that mandated by Utah, into the
family's privacy. He also pointed out that the Court had never held that paren-
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applied to all minors, including those who were mature and
emancipated. Consequently, the notice requirement did not facilitate traditional parental child rearing responsibilities.
Instead of using the opportunity presented in Matheson to
clarify important questions regarding the extent and degree of
constitutional protection available to minors facing critical
choices in matters of extreme importance and sensitivity, the
Court further confused constitutional jurisprudence in this
area. As in its Bellotti decision, the Court made no effort to define the scope of a minor's privacy right. The Court's decision
to uphold the challenged legislation again indicates that it is
unlikely to expand privacy protection for a child faced with a
parental notification requirement much beyond the abortion
right.12 7 Even with the previously recognized abortion right at
issue, the majority failed to articulate explicitly the applicable
standard of review. In part, the Chief Justice's opinion seemed
to apply a heightened scrutiny standard of review, but his conclusion that the states need not "fine-tune" their abortion statutes contradicts such an approach. Justice Marshall's
dissenting opinion demonstrates the majority's misapplication
of a heightened scrutiny standard of review.128 In addition, although he accepted the narrowness of the Court's holding, Justice Powell, author of Bellotti, separately concurred, and
restated his belief that the courts must flexibly weigh the interests of the child and the state against each other to resolve the
constitutional question. Justice Powell's separate opinion
would appear to reflect his concern that the majority had selected a different standard of review than that enunciated in
Bellotti. The Chief Justice's Matheson opinion certainly relies
more upon an ends-means approach to the issue than upon a
balancing rationale. With Justice Stewart, a member of the majority, joining Justice Powell in his concurrence, it is possible
that the Chief Justice's approach might lack majority support
in future cases. Despite repeated efforts to define constitutal authority was absolute, and that the Court had previously denied legal protection to parental authority. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
127. This conclusion is certainly consistent with the views expressed by
Justices White, Powell, and Stevens in their concurring opinions in Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). See also text accompanying notes
71-76 supra.
128. Regarding the majority's assertion that the statute promotes state
health interests by facilitating the transfer of medical information about the
child from her parents to the doctor, 450 U.S. at 411, Justice Marshall correctly
used a "narrow means" analysis to point out that the statute imposed no obligation to transfer this information. Id. at 444 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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tional review standards for legislation affecting the rights of
children, it is possible to conclude that none of the proffered
analyses, including the confusing Matheson rationale, has the
allegiance of a majority of the Justices.
E.

PARHAM V.

,J.R.

In Parham v. J.R.,129 the Court again confronted constitutional claims asserted on behalf of children who challenged a
state statute that accorded their parents virtually unrestrained
authority to commit them to state mental institutions. The children argued that due process entitled them to procedural protections before commitment. Speaking through Chief Justice
Burger, the Court tested Georgia's statutory commitment
scheme against well recognized due process precepts. This involved weighing three interlocking factors: the private interest
affected by official action; the state's interest, including possible
fiscal and administrative burdens; and the value of additional
protections in avoiding an erroneous decision. 30 Notwithstanding the claim that procedural due process entitled the affected
children to adversarial judicial hearings,' 3 ' the Court concluded
that Georgia's commitment procedures, which provided for review of parents' commitment decisions by hospital physicians,
were constitutionally adequate. 32 Although the Court recognized that the hospitalization decision implicated a child's constitutionally protected liberty interests, it felt that deference to
parental authority, rather than formal confrontation between
parent and child in a courtroom atmosphere, was appropriate
in view of the long established principle that parents generally
act in their child's best interests.

33

the state's parens patriae role,

34

In an apparent reference to

the Court further asserted

129. 442 U.S. 584 (1979). Chief Justice Burger authored the Court's opinion,
in which Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist joined. Justice
Stewart separately concurred. Id. at 621 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part in an
opinion by Justice Brennan. Id. at 625 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
130. Id. at 599-600. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S.
816, 848 (1977); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
131. 442 U.S. at 603.
132. Id. at 620.
133. Id. at 603. The Court relied upon several previous decisions that recognized that parents retain broad authority over their children. Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 400 (1923). For further discussion of these decisions, see text accompany-

ing notes 163-75 infra.
134. See note 214 infra and accompanying text.
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that most children, even adolescents, lacked the wisdom to
make many important decisions, including those concerning
medical care. 135 Additionally, Chief Justice Burger questioned
the institutional competence of state officials and courts, those
customarily involved in adversarial commitment proceedings,
36
to review parental decisions.1
Nevertheless, the Chief Justice concluded that minimal
due process requirements compelled some degree of governmental oversight. He felt that the Georgia statutory provision,
which required independent review of the child's commitment
by state hospital authorities, supplied this oversight function
and thereby served to check potentially improper parental decisions. 137 This provision also provided a basis for distinguishing
the Court's earlier Planned Parenthood decision. The Chief
Justice argued that in PlannedParenthoodthe challenged statute had provided for an absolute parental veto over the child's
abortion decision, whereas the Georgia provision, providing for
physician review, did not permit unbridled parental authority
over the mental commitment decision.138 In the final analysis,
the Court placed the burden of the decision upon the state's
physician who would independently decide whether or not the
state mental institution should admit the child upon his or her
parents' request. Although this independent evaluation did not
fully recognize the claims advanced on behalf of the children, it
still suggests that the Court accorded enough constitutional significance to the children's interests to curtail the scope of parental authority by injecting the state, albeit marginally, into
the commitment decision.
Justice Brennan, writing in partial dissent for himself and
Justices Marshall and Stevens, advocated a more restrictive
view of the deference which the Court should accord a parental
commitment decision, arguing that due process required full
post admission adversarial hearings. In Justice Brennan's
135.

442 U.S. at 603.

136. Id. at 604.
137. Id. at 607, 613. The Court also held that due process required a periodic
review by the hospital medical staff of the minor patient's condition to determine whether continued institutionalization was necessary. Id.
138. Id. at 604. Justice Stewart, in his concurrence, argued for virtual total

governmental deference to a parent's decisions concerning hospitalization for
his or her child. Id. at 621-25 (Stewart, J., concurring). He also distinguished
Planned Parenthood,because that case involved a minor's "personal substantive constitutional right," the right to decide upon an abortion, whereas
Parham did not implicate any similar substantive constitutional right available
to children. Id. at 623 n.6.
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opinion, the Court's decision in Planned Parenthoodfully controlled; he equated the child's interest in avoiding a wrongful
commitment initiated by the child's parents with that of a child
facing a pregnancy compelled by parental veto of her abortion
decision.139 Moreover, he was unwilling to characterize a parent's commitment decision as "routine" and thus entitled to
constitutional protection, because the decision itself signalled
the collapse of a harmonious family relationship. 140 In contrast
to PlannedParenthoodin which the Court postulated the likelihood of familial conflict, he felt that Parham represented the
reality of that conflict which undermined any presumption that
the parents' actions were in the child's best interests.141 Striking a different balance than the majority, Justice Brennan concluded that the child's interests outweighed any parental claim
that traditional child rearing prerogatives deserved deference,
and he thus required substantial due process safeguards.142
The Parham decision, although it did not involve a child's
privacy claim, posed underlying constitutional questions concerning the parent-child relationship in the context of familial
disharmony similar to those raised in Bellotti and Matheson
and their predecessors. It is appropriate, therefore, to compare
Parham with these cases. Justice Brennan correctly recognized in Parham that the parental decision to institutionalize
one of the family members indicated the likelihood of family
discord, whereas conflict was simply a possibility in the abortion cases. Nevertheless, the Court was willing to defer considerably to the parental decision in Parham, while it virtually
foreclosed parental decision making in Bellotti. 43 To distinguish the cases on the basis of the constitutional right affected
by the state statute' 4 4 suggests that the Court gives considera139. Id. at 631 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 631-32.
142. Id. at 630-32. Justice Brennan specifically concluded that the Constitution entitled a child facing parental commitment to a state mental institution to
a due process postadmission hearing before long-term confinement could ensue. Although he felt that a preadmission hearing was unnecessary in view of
the physician screening requirements of the Georgia statute, he argued that a
postcommitment adversarial hearing would be neither unduly burdensome nor
disruptive of the family. Id. at 632-37.
143. Although the Court in Matheson upheld the requirement of parental
notification prior to a minor's abortion, it excluded from its holding those cases
in which family hostility could be expected. 450 U.S. at 407 n.14. Thus, an unstable and possibly hostile family situation will likely foreclose parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision through prior notification.
144. Justice Stewart argued this point in his Parham concurrence. See note
138 supra.
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ble significance to a minor's privacy rights, at least those implicated in the abortion decision. Moreover, the Court did not
entirely defer to parental authority in any of the cases. The
Court, therefore, does not appear to subscribe to the principle
of absolute parental authority in managing critically important
matters in the child's life.145
One other similarity in the two decisions is significant. In
both Parham and Bellotti the Court interposed an authority
from outside the family to review the ultimate decision. The
Court in Parham required that a state hospital physician review the parental decision to commit the child. Because hospitalization essentially involved a medical determination, the
Court believed that a medical professional, rather than a judge,
should oversee the decision.146 The Court in Bellotti requires,
in the absence of parental involvement, a judge or other administrative official to review the child's critical decision to
abort.147 Because the abortion decision, like the institutionalization decision, is primarily a medical one, 148 it is difficult to
understand the Court's rationale for involving judicial officials,
rather than medical professionals, in the abortion decision
making process. The standards which exist in the civil commitment context to provide guidance to a judicial official149 are at
145. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. at 630 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
146. 442 U.S. at 613.
147. 443 U.S. at 643.
148. In the abortion context, the Court has recognized that the decision is
principally a medical one. In Roe v. Wade it stated that "the abortion decision
in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest with the physician." 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973). See
also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973). Various medical and scientific studies also support the proposition that important medical considerations are critical to the abortion decision. For women between the ages of 15 and 19, the risk
of death posed by pregnancy and childbearing is more than nine times greater
than the mortality rate associated with legal abortion during the first trimester
of pregnancy or the use of contraceptives. Tietze, New Estimates of Mortality
Associated with Fertility Control, 9 FAm. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 74 (1977). Also,
greater risks of mortality and prematurity, as well as physical and intellectual
defects, are present with infants born to teenage mothers than with infants
born to older mothers. Menken, The Health and Social Consequences of Teenage Childbearing,4 FAro. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 45 (1972). But see ILL.v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981) ('The medical, emotional, and psychological
consequences of an abortion are serious and can be lasting; this is particularly
so when the patient is immature."); id. at 423 (Stevens, J., concurring); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 103 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
In the institutionalization context, the Court has consistently emphasized
the medical character of the commitment decision. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442
U.S. 584, 607-08 (1979); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979).
149. Although state civil commitment standards vary widely, many state
statutes require a court to determine whether individuals are mentally ill and
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least as clear as the nebulous "best interests" standard the
Court set forth without elaboration in Bellotti.150 Although
subjective factors may enter into the judge's final resolution of
the abortion question, they may also arise in a physician's commitment decision.151 This argument suggests that once the
Court determined that the Constitution forbids mandatory parental consent in the abortion context, it should have simply
deferred to the physician-patient decision.152 This result would
subject both the abortion and commitment decisions to medical
review, and the minor would not be cut adrift without any adult
guidance.
The answer to the different result in each case apparently
lies in Justice Powell's footnote in Bellotti characterizing the
operating procedures of an abortion clinic. 5 3 Ironically, this
description closely parallels accounts of the psychiatric evaluation procedures generally employed by a state mental institution when it admits a patient.154 Finally, Justice Powell's
further concern in Bellotti about the inability of a minor to select effectively between ethical and unethical abortion clinics
belittles the professional standards governing licensed physicians and the state's role in overseeing such clinics.15s
whether they pose a danger to themselves or others. The statutes usually provide definitions of mental illness and dangerousness. See Developments in the
Law--Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1190, 1203-05
(1974). Although this standard has been criticized as unduly vague, courts
have regularly upheld it against constitutional attack on due process grounds.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 157 W. Va. 417, 438-39, 202 S.E.2d 109,
123-24 (1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
150. The Court in Bellotti did not offer any elaboration upon its "best interests" standard. Courts and commentators have criticized this standard as a serious inadequacy of the decision. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 655-56 (1979)
(Stevens, J., concurring). See also Note, Due Process-A State Abortion Statute
That Imposes a Blanket Parental Consultation Requirement on Minors, and
Fails to Distinguish Between Mature and Immature Minors Constitutes a Denial of Due Process, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 337, 359 (1980).
151. See 442 U.S. at 628-29 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
152. See Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 793 (5th Cir. 1975), affid mem. sub
nom. Gerstein v. Coe, 428 U.S. 901 (1976). ("[I]f a minor consults a physician in
order to decide whether to have an abortion, the physician is in a position to
counsel the minor as to the physical-and perhaps mental-consequences of
her decision."). See also Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375, 1387 n.22 (7th Cir. 1978).
153. 443 U.S. at 641 n.21 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 91-92 n.2 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
154. See T. ScHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL 144 (1966); Gilboy & Schmidt, "Voluntary" Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 66 Nw. U. L. REV. 429, 436 (1971).
See generally Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 13 SANTA CLARA
LAw. 379 (1973).

155. The Court has recognized that it can expect physicians to proceed with
professional integrity in handling abortion cases. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,
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In recognizing and attempting to resolve the issues
presented in Bellotti, Matheson, and Parham with the likelihood of underlying familial disharmony present in each case,
the Court seems sensitive to the need to minimize that conflict.
In Bellotti, because of the likelihood of a parental veto or
strong parental pressure on the child making an abortion decision, either of which could lead to discord, the Court held that
the alternative avenue of judicial approval without parental involvement must be available. In Matheson, although the Court
gave constitutional sanction to the principle of parental notification preceding a minor child's abortion, the Court specifically
avoided extending the holding to those situations in which family hostility could be anticipated. Similarly, by not engrafting
an adversarial hearing onto the commitment process, the Court
in Parham hoped to avoid aggravating preexisting family tensions or creating further problems. It is reasonable to argue,
therefore, that the interest of family harmony and integrity
may represent the Court's guiding principle in resolving the
constitutional claims presented in these cases. By not explicitly recognizing that fact, the Court has missed the opportunity
to clarify much of the confusion in this area and to enunciate
workable principles to guide courts in similar future cases.
Ill.

PARENTS AND THE STATE

Once a court recognizes a constitutional claim asserted by
a child seeking privacy in his or her decision making, it must
examine the importance of countervailing state interests advanced in support of statutory restrictions upon the child's
freedom of choice.156 Although the Court's standard of review
remains uncertain in view of the conflicting analyses presented
in Carey, Bellotti, and Matheson, the Court will clearly weigh
the minor child's constitutional claim against the state's interests. 5 7 The state generally has legislative authority pursuant
to its police power to assure public health, safety, welfare, and
195-200 (1973). See also id. at 208 (Burger, C.J., concurring). When a physician
acts unprofessionally, review by the medical licensing organization is available.
Id. at 199-200. Additionally, the Court has indicated that states can adopt standards for licensing facilities where abortions are performed. Id. at 194-95. See
also Gary - Nw. Ind. Women's Servs., Inc. v. Bowen, 496 F. Supp. 894 (N.D. Ind.
1980), affid mem. sub nom. Gary - Nw. Ind. Women's Servs. v. Orr, 101 S. Ct.
2012 (1981).
156. See ILL. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622, 648 (1979); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977).
157. See Developments, supra note 1, at 1193-95.
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morality. 58 Acting under its public welfare power, the state
may mandate parental involvement in a minor child's important decisions in order to achieve health, safety, or morality
objectives. The state has an additional interest through its
parens patriae power in assuring the welfare of children. This
interest can justify state intervention into the family to protect
children who might be particularly vulnerable or unable to care
for themselves. In the case of children asserting autonomy
from their parents by challenging a statutory mandate requiring parental involvement, the state may allege one or more of
these interests in support of the statute. Therefore, in view of
the complex individual, familial, and societal interests implicated in such a controversy, it is necessary to evaluate carefully
the state's interests, and the premises underlying them, before
deciding whether an aspect of a child's life is constitutionally
protected against legislative interference.
A. PARENTAL AuTHoiRy AND THE FAMILY
The courts have broadly construed the welfare component
of the police power, 5 9 and hence this component is relied upon
as authority for much of the state legislative activity regulating
family matters. This legislation generally reflects the state's
deference to parents and their decisions in child rearing matters, thereby reflecting long-standing constitutional doctrine
and common law tradition.160 State reluctance to interfere unduly in the family relationship, through legislation or other
means, is consistent with constitutional jurisprudence recognizing the principle of familial privacy.161 Despite this strong
emphasis upon parental and familial autonomy, the state may
properly limit parental authority and intervene in family affairs
62
when the welfare of a child is at issue.1
The courts have given explicit constitutional recognition to
the concept that parents are principally responsible for the
care and supervision of their children. The Court first recognized and protected this parental right as an aspect of liberty
158. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926);
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1905).
159. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944); West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398-99 (1937).
160. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968); Hafen, supra note 1, at 615-19.
161. E.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
162.

See R. MNooK=,

supra note 1, at 1214.

CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE 495-96 (1978); Developments,
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under the fourteenth amendment in Meyer v. Nebraska.163 In
Meyer, the Court invalidated a Nebraska statute limiting the
teaching of foreign languages, partially because it interfered
with the right of parents to control the education of their children.164 Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,165 the
Court invalidated an Oregon law requiring that parents educate
their children in the public schools. A unanimous Court relied
upon Meyer to conclude that the Constitution protected the
parents' right to "direct the upbringing and education of chil66
dren under their control."1
Meyer and Pierce survived the Court's post-Lochner retrenchment of due process principles, and the Court has subsequently relied upon them to recognize, under the due process
clause, the parental right to raise children free from state interference. In Prince v. Massachusetts,167 the Court stated that
"[iut is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of
the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder."16 8 More recently, in Wisconsin v.
Yoder,169 the Court accepted the first and fourteenth amendment arguments of Amish parents prosecuted under a state
compulsory school attendance statute when they refused to
send their children to public school because of their religious
convictions. The Court concluded that the Amish parents'
traditional prerogatives in raising their children, combined with
their claim to religious freedom, implicated fundamental
rights.17 0 The Court thus required the state to justify its position by more than the mere reasonable relationship standard,
which the state was unable to do.171 Finally, in Stanley v. Illinois,172 the Court upheld an unmarried father's claim to constitutional protection against a state statute that summarily
denied his claim to the custody of his children upon their
mother's death by characterizing his right as a parent to raise
his children as "essential" and among the "basic civil rights of
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

262 U.S. 390 (1923).
Id. at 401.
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Id. at 534-35.
321 U.S. 158 (1944).
Id. at 166. See also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Id. at 219.
Id. at 233.
405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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man."1 73 It is apparent that the Court includes the right of par-

ents to control and direct the upbringing of their children
among those fundamental rights embraced within the due process clause, and thereby entitled to extraordinary judicial
174
protection.
While establishing the constitutional rights of parents to direct and supervise their children, the Court has recognized that
the state is a poor substitute for parents in raising children. In
the early Meyer decision, Justice McReynolds explicitly rejected the notion of state-supervised child rearing as inconsistent with the philosophical underpinnings of the American
constitutional scheme and Western cultural tradition. 75 More
recently in Parhamv. J.R., Chief Justice Burger reiterated this
view by concluding that "[t] he statist notion that governmental
power should supersede parental authority in all cases because
some parents abuse and neglect children is repugnant to the
American tradition."176 The Court has expressed particular
concern that state intervention into parental child rearing prerogatives will inevitably lead to the standardization of children-a result repugnant to the Western tradition of
individualism.177 Moreover, the state's impersonal institutions
have proven to be rather insensitive and inept in responding to
the psychological and other needs of children entrusted to its
care. 178
The Court has also made it clear that the due process
173. Id. at 651 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
174. But see Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 101 S. Ct. 2153 (1981).
While recognizing the parental interest as "commanding" and "extremely important," the Court held in Lassiter that the fourteenth amendment did not require a state to provide counsel for an indigent parent facing a state-initiated
action for termination of parental rights. Id. at 2160, 2162. The Court distinguished between criminal cases in which individuals were entitled to representation by counsel because they faced loss of physical liberty, and termination of
parental rights cases which did not involve the same liberty interests. Id. at
2158-59. The result in Lassiter suggests that the Court does not value the parental interest so highly that countervailing state interests cannot overcome
the parental right, even when that interest might be lost.
175. 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923).
176. 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979).
177. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). See also Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637-38 (1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972);
Developments, supra note 1, at 1214-16.
178. See BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 19, at 13 ("By its intrusion
[into the family] the state may make a bad situation worse; indeed, it may turn
a tolerable or even a good situation into a bad one."). See also Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Searchfor Realistic Standards,
27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 992 (1975).
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clause protects family privacy against unjustified state interference. In Prince v. Massachusetts,7 9 for example, the Court relied upon the Meyer and Pierce decisions to recognize a
180
"private realm of family life which the state cannot enter."'
And in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,181 the Court reiterated
its commitment to family privacy, and declared unconstitutional an overly intrusive local zoning ordinance forbidding certain related individuals from residing together as a family. The
Court's repeated observation that the state is inherently illsuited to assume child rearing responsibilities further reinforces the notion of family privacy. Thus, it is reasonable to
treat the concept of family privacy as a constitutional limitation
on the power of the state to insert itself into the internal dynamics of the family.
The Court has additionally extended constitutional due
process protection to the interests of individual family members in the maintenance of the family as an institution. In
Moore, the Court held that family membership was within the
cluster of traditional values constitutionally recognized as privacy interests.182 The Court invalidated a city zoning ordinance
limiting the number of family members who could live together
in a single dwelling, and precluded Mrs. Moore from sharing
her apartment with her two grandchildren who were cousins,
not brothers. Applying substantive due process concepts, Justice Powell, in his plurality opinion, discerned a strong commitment to the institution of the family in the nation's history and
tradition.183 He further found that American tradition supported a broader concept of the family than that recognized in
East Cleveland's zoning ordinance.18 4 The Court, therefore,
179. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
180. Id. at 166.
181. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
182. Id. at 499.
183. "It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our
most cherished values, moral and cultural." Id. at 503-04.
184. But see Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform,
431 U.S. 816 (1977). In Smith, the Court suggested that families founded upon
neither a blood relationship nor marriage were distinguishable for constitutional due process purposes from those based upon such a relationship. Id. at
842-47. Although Smith involved a procedural due process challenge, the
Court's analysis of foster parents' "liberty" interest in their relationship with
their foster children included a review of the Meyer-Pierce line of cases and indicated that the degree of constitutional protection afforded the foster relationship was minimal. The Court distinguished Moore, because that case involved
a biological family relationship, whereas the foster family was a state-created
entity which necessarily affected the ongoing rights of the natural parents to
their children. Id. See also Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974)
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would protect the family as an entity, at least in traditional familial relationships, from state incursions that could not withstand careful judicial scrutiny.18 5 Although the Court
purported to vindicate Mrs. Moore's individual right to freedom
in personal choices involving family matters, a critical factor in
the Court's analysis plainly was the historical significance it accorded the family as a unit, and its reluctance to defer to
broadly drawn legislative judgments which unduly infringed
upon the family's autonomy. The Court in Moore, therefore,
recognized not only the importance of the family unit to the
parents in fulfilling their child rearing interests, but also its importance to children in realizing their growth and development
toward adulthood.186 In this sense, the Moore Court directly
acknowledged the family as an independent institution and the
interests of both parent and child in the family structure, and
only tangentially acknowledged parental prerogatives in child
rearing.
Because Meyer, Pierce, and their progeny generally involved cases in which the parents and child joined against the
state's intrusion into their relationship,187 the Court was able to
avoid inquiry into the complex issue of the parent-child relationship. When the interests of parent and child collide, however, it is not clear that the constitutional principles underlying
these decisions necessarily support legislative reinforcement of
parental child rearing prerogatives. 88 Three distinct, yet interrelated, constitutional principles emerge from the Court's holdings to limit the state's authority under its police power to
regulate family matters-parental authority in child rearing,
family privacy, and family institutional integrity. These principles are neither synonymous nor necessarily harmonious with
each other. 89 This becomes particularly evident when each
(no constitutional privacy right infringed by city zoning ordinance prohibiting
more than two unrelated individuals from living together).
185. 431 U.S. at 499.
186. See BEFORE THE BEST INrERESTS, supra note 19, at 13; Hafen, supra
note 1, at 651.
187. See Note, The Minor'sRight of Privacy: Limitations on State Action After Danforth and Carey, 77 CoLUM. L. REv. 1216, 1224 (1977); Developments,
supra note 1, at 1219 n.137.
188. See ILL. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 446-47 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Cf. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979) (Court refused to recognize
that the parental authority right guaranteed parental involvement in a child's
abortion decision).
189. See Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 794 (5th Cir. 1975), affd mem. sub
nom. Gerstein v. Coe, 428 U.S. 901 (1976) (holding that the importance of the
intrafamilial relationship and family privacy outweighed the state interest in
parental authority when a statute granted parents a veto over their child's
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principle is individually evaluated as the basis for a state legislative decision requiring parental involvement in situations implicating children's constitutional privacy interests. The
concept of parental authority certainly serves as a legitimate
state interest underlying a legislative decision to reinforce the
parental role.190 The concept of family privacy, however, suggests that state intrusion into the family in any guise, even to
support the parental role, is undesirable.19 1 The principle of
family institutional integrity, which recognizes the fundamental
importance of the family unit to all members, also mitigates
against any form of state legislative interference that might
jeopardize the family as a unit.192 Therefore, when the state

legislatively chooses to reinforce parental authority in real or
potential parent-child conflict situations, it may be overlooking
or disregarding other important interests, each with venerable
constitutional status in its own right. 9 3
It is also important to note that neither the principle of parental authority nor that of family privacy is absolute.194 When
parents either abuse or neglect a child, or reach potentially lifethreatening decisions which may seriously impair a child's
well-being, the state may intervene into the privacy of the family to assure the child's welfare. 95 The rationale for this authority is that children as a class are particularly vulnerable
and lack the ability to protect themselves. Necessarily, substantive and procedural constitutional doctrine narrowly conabortion decision); Developments, supra note 1, at 1218-19 (distinguishing between the state's interest in protecting family privacy against excessive governmental intervention and the state's interest in reinforcing parental authority).
190. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 409-10 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622, 637-39 (1979).
191. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 447-48 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 794 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd mem. sub nom. Gerstein V. Coe, 428 U.S. 901 (1976). See also Note, supra note 187, at 1244;
Developments, supra note 1, at 1219.
192. See Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 794 (5th Cir. 1975), affid mem. sub
noma. Gerstein v. Coe, 428 U.S. 901 (1976). Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976) (requiring parental consent for a minor's abortion is unlikely to strengthen the family unit); Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825
(2d Cir. 1977) ("right to the preservation of family integrity encompasses the
reciprocal rights of both parent and children").
193. In view of the conflict occurring between the various interests, it is important to reconcile them as effectively as possible. See Section IV infra.
194. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 101 S. Ct. 2153, 2160 (1981);
H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 419 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring).
195. See Developments, supra note 1, at 1315. See also Goldstein, Medical
Care for the Child at Risk On State Supervention of ParentalAutonomy, 86
YALE LJ. 645, 651 (1977).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:459

fines this power.196 The practical limitation imposed by the
state's inability to fulfill adequately the parental role further restricts the state's interventionist efforts.19 7 Nevertheless, since
the state has an interest in the welfare of the child that can justify intrusion into the family and parental decisions, the state's
authority can temper the principle of parental authority in order to assure the child's well-being.
B.

HEALTH AND SAFETY

The Court has generally recognized that state attainment
of the police power objectives of public health or safety is sufficiently important to override competing constitutional claims of
individual citizens. Indeed, the Court has characterized the
achievement of health or safety objectives as a "compelling
state interest."' 98 As long as a state chooses narrowly drawn
means to accomplish a health or safety goal, the courts will
usually find that it is operating within its sphere of constitutional authority, even if the legislative choice invades a fundamental interest, such as a privacy right.199 Given the less
rigorous judicial review applicable when such legislation involves a minor child's privacy rights, the Court's rationale in
H.L. v. Matheson suggests that the Court may defer to any arguably tenable health justification that it can infer from a parental notification requirement. Despite the dissent's argument
that the Utah statute imposed no requirement upon parents to
supply medical information when their daughter has chosen an
abortion, the majority still concluded that the notification requirements furthered a state health objective by insuring that
her doctor had access to medical information before performing
an abortion. 200 Nevertheless, when health or safety concerns
196. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
197. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979); BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 19, at 12.
198. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150, 154, 163 (1973). It also is impor-

tant to note that the Court has signalled that it will carefully look at the actual
purpose of the legislation, rather than simply accept any proffered post hoc rationalization. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 242-45 (1981) (Powell, J.,
dissenting); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 n.7 (1976). See also Gunther, supra
note 36, at 46.
199. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
200. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981). But see id. at 442-43 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The majority in Matheson indicated that the Utah parental notification requirement would not apply to a minor facing a medical
emergency. 450 U.S. at 406-07.
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prompt state legislation, the principle of deference to parental
decision making is not absolute. If a parental decision might
seriously jeopardize the child's health or welfare, the state retains the authority to override parental wishes in order to protect individual children. 20 1 The state also retains the power to
override parental decisions to protect the health or safety of
202
the general public.
In pursuing health or safety goals, the state may eliminate
parental involvement in a child's important personal decisions.
For example, various state statutes have authorized minors to
secure medical or professional assistance for matters such as
drug addiction, psychiatric problems, or contraceptive information without first obtaining parental consent.20 3 Explicit in
such a statutory scheme is a legislative judgment that the minor child's individual interests, as well as societal interests, in
anonymously obtaining assistance are sufficiently important to
override the parental interest in prior consultation or involvement.2 04 Implicit in this judgment is the realization that familial discord may accompany revelation of a child's problems to
his or her parents, and may ultimately prevent the child from
receiving assistance. 205 If the legislature has reasonably concluded that parental consent or notification requirements may
frustrate legitimate health or safety goals, it seems appropriate
for the courts to reject contrary parental constitutional claims
and to defer to the balance achieved by the legislature in
weighing the competing interests of parent and child.206 Al201. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (child labor statute upheld as within state's parens patriae power, and applicable to prevent Jehovah's Witness from using children to distribute religious literature); Jehovah's
Witness v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (three judge
court), affid, 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (upheld Washington statute authorizing state
court to order blood transfusions to children of Jehovah's Witness despite parental objection). See also Bennett, Allocation of Child Medical Care Decisionmaking Authority: A Suggested Interest Analysis, 62 VA. L. REv. 285, 301 (1976).
202. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding state

police power as basis for compulsory vaccination statute). See also Bennett,
supra note 201, at 294.
203. See Bennett, supra note 201, at 292-94. Cf. Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 829 (1980) (upholding Michigan family planning

clinic's policy of distributing contraceptives to minors without prior parental
notification).
204. See Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375, 1388 (7th Cir. 1978).
205. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 438-39 n.24 (1981) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
206. Deference to the legislature's choice is appropriate in this instance because an individual privacy interest could be asserted on behalf of the child,
and the state's decision not to require parental involvement furthers the interests of family privacy and integrity. See Section IV infra. Moreover, there is
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though state health and safety purposes involving children usually dictate governmental deference to parental responsibility
for their children's care, the state may, consistent with constitutional principles, override adverse parental decisions, or even
provide for essential services to minors without prior parental
consultation.
C. MORA=
The Supreme Court has not yet agreed upon the importance which it should ascribe to the state's public morality interest under its police power in the face of a challenge that
morality-directed legislation infringes upon a privacy interest.
Individual Justices have suggested that state enforcement of
morality objectives, particularly through criminal laws regulating sexual conduct, is constitutionally valid, notwithstanding
conflicting privacy claims asserted on behalf of the affected individual.207 These assertions, however, may reflect more upon
the nature of the privacy claim advanced than upon the
strength of the state's interest.20 8 Given the Court's carefully
limited approach to the privacy realm, its reluctance to question a plethora of state criminal laws regulating individual
moral behavior is not surprising. The Court is clearly far from
embracing any notion of unbridled personal liberty even if individual conduct does not affect others. As a consequence, legislation designed to assure youthful morality will likely
withstand any challenge based upon the claim that the state's
interest is not sufficient to support infringement of a privacy
right.209 Additionally, such legislation usually commands pano doubt that parents are well represented in the legislative process, while children claim no direct representation since they do not enjoy the right to vote in
state elections until they reach the age of eighteen. In view of this fact, it
seems appropriate to defer to a legislative judgment which seemingly protects
the interests of an unrepresented portion of the populace. Cf. Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (upholding congressional minority employment
preference statute in public works projects); Tribe, Childhood,Suspect Classifi.
cations, and Conclusive Presumptions: Three Linked Riddles, 39 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 8, 9, 32 (Summer 1975) (suggesting semisuspect classification
status for minors).
207. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 702 (1977)
(White, J., concurring).
208. See Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 578 F.2d 1374 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp.
1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three judge court), affid mem, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
209. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 702-03 (1977) (White,
J., concurring); id. at 713 (Stevens, J., concurring); Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629, 640 (1968). Cf. Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450
U.S. 464, 472-73 n.8 (1981) (state has the authority to make sexual intercourse
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rental support, because it probably reinforces traditional moral
210
values consistent with those held by the majority of parents.
When considering morality-directed legislation which has
implicated privacy interests, the Court has carefully examined
the rationality of the means chosen by a state to accomplish its
objectives. For example, in Eisenstadtv. Baird the Court could
perceive no rational connection between the state's interest in
discouraging extramarital sexual activity and its proscription
21
against the sale of contraceptives to unmarried persons. '
Similarly, in Carey v. Population Services International the
Court held that New York's decision to discourage sexual activity among teenagers by forbidding them access to nonhazardous contraceptives was irrational, because it portended the
possibility of pregnancy as punishment for youthful sexual activity.2 12 When parental notification or consent statutes constitute the means selected by the state to accomplish a morality
objective, the Court should, therefore, carefully assess the reasonableness of such a requirement even if individual Justices,
as in the Carey case, are unwilling to find that it implicates a
child's privacy right. Although prior notification or consent
statutes might appear to be reasonable means to assure parental participation in a minor's moral decisions, such requirements also implicate additional considerations of family
privacy and integrity. 2 13 Thus, it is not appropriate for the
Court simply to defer to legislative judgments regulating the
moral conduct of children through parental involvement statutes without assuring itself that the legislation actually furthers the interests of the parent and child without
unnecessarily undermining the family. This inquiry is consistent with a careful review of the chosen legislative means and
the presumptions underlying them.
among teenagers a crime). But see Developments, supra note 1, at 1209; Comment, Roe and Paris: Does Privacy Have a Principle?,26 STAN. L' REV. 1161,
1171 (1974).
210. Cf. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (parents are entitled
to the support of state laws in carrying out their responsibilities).
211. 405 U.S. at 450-52.
212. 431 U.S. at 694-99. But see Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma
County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (Court upheld a California statutory rape law making the activity of men a crime but not that of women, despite a claim of sex
discrimination, by concluding that men and women are not similarly situated
with respect to pregnancy and its attendant risks).
213. See text accompanying notes 187-93 supra.
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PARENS PATRIAE

The parens patriae authority provides a legal basis for the
state to protect those citizens who lack the capacity to care for
themselves. The predicate for parens patriae state intervention
is the presumption that certain classes of citizens, such as children or the mentally handicapped, are particularly vulnerable
to exploitation and lack the ability to care adequately for themselves. 2 1 4 Legislation giving parens patriae authority to the

state generally sanctions state intervention into the lives of
these citizens when they face threatening circumstances; the
state effectively assumes a caretaking responsibility for the individual's welfare.
The state has placed the major responsibility for children
with their parents-a decision which is consistent with Western cultural tradition, constitutional principles, and widely accepted child rearing doctrines.215 But the law has also long
recognized that the vulnerability of children entitles them to
special protection. The state thus retains the power to intervene in the parent-child relationship when abuse, neglect, or ir216
reparable family discord seriously impair the child's welfare.
Since, upon intervention, the state assumes the parent's responsibilities, 2 17 its intrusion is only justified under extremely
exigent circumstances. Indeed, numerous commentators have
argued that the state should virtually avoid all intervention on
the grounds that an uninterrupted relationship between parent
and child is the best environment for a child's growth and development.21 8 Societal interests of stability and continuity are
assured if the family remains viable, and the parents remain
principally responsible for the child.
214. See generallyDevelopments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, supra note 149, at 1207-22; Comment, State Intrusions into Family Affairs: Justificationsand Limitations, 26 STAN L. REv. 1383, 1391 (1974).
215. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968); Watson, supra note 1, at 667. See also notes 163-74
supra and accompanying text.
216. See Developments, supra note 1, at 1315. See also In re Snyder, 85
Wash. 2d 182, 532 P.2d 278 (1974); Wald, supra note 103, at 278 n.92.
217. The state has available less intrusive means to intervene in the parentchild relationship than the termination of parental custody. For instance, the
state may assume a supervisory role over the family with the child remaining
in the home, or it may provide counseling services. Dickens, Legal Responses
to Child Abuse, 12 FlAm. L Q. 1, 23 (1978). See generally Lowry, The Judge v.
The Social Worker: Can Arbitrary Decisionmakingbe Tempered by the Courts?,
52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1033 (1977).
218. BEFORE THE BEST IMRSTS, supra note 19, at 3-14; Watson, supra note
1, at 667-68.
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Since the assumption of youthful incapacity is a fundamental predicate for parens patriae legislation regulating the family, and since a similar assumption also underlies police power
legislation regulating parent-child relations, judicial developments in the parens patriae area deserve some attention. Such
analysis will provide a useful analogy for evaluating claims of
parental authority. The landmark In re Gault decision directly
challenged and largely discredited many of the uncritically accepted presumptions regarding the state's parens patriae role
in the juvenile justice system. 2 19 Until Gault, courts widely believed that the government's primary role as the beneficent
protector of wayward youths, assuring that their best interests
were served through thoughtful state intervention into their
lives, warranted the state's maintenance of a procedurally flexible juvenile justice system. 2 20 The courts occasionally recognized that this system might involve judicial commitment to an
institution, but they presumed that these training school experiences were therapeutic encounters with helpful adult counselors. The Court in Gault realized, however, that despite the
lofty purposes presumed to flow from the state's parens patriae
role, the reality of the juvenile justice system was more closely
akin to that of a penal system. 22 1 The asserted altruistic purposes were mostly unsupported by the hard realities of juvenile incarceration. The Court consequently held that due
process required procedural regularity in state delinquency
proceedings, notwithstanding the state's ostensible purpose of
assisting and redirecting the child.
Following the Gault decision, courts critically began to
scrutinize other aspects of state activity based upon the parens
patriae power. Rejecting state claims of well intentioned motives, courts ruled that constitutional requirements limited
drastic state intervention, such as neglect or civil commitment
proceedings, which disrupted the lives of children and their
families. 22 2 Some courts interpreted the Gault aftermath as
largely discrediting the parens patriae power as a basis for
219. 387 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1967).
220. Id. at 14-19. See generally Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical
Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970).
221. 387 U.S. at 17-18.
222. See, e.g., Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 679 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (termination of
parental rights); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (civil commitment); Marsden v. Commonwealth, 352 Mass. 564, 227 N.E.2d 1 (1967) (termination of parental rights); State ex rel Hawks v. Lazaro, 157 W. Va. 417, 202
S.E.2d 109 (1974) (civil commitment).
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state action. 223 These interpretations proved premature; the
Supreme Court has reaffirmed the continuing vitality of parens
patriae in several recent cases. 224 Nevertheless, Gault and its
progeny reminded the states that although the parens patriae
power remained a legitimate basis for state action, constitutional requirements circumscribed its scope. These requirements mandate judicial inquiry into underlying assumptions
concerning the state's role with respect to children and other
incapacitated individuals. As a result, substantive and procedural constitutional requirements have limited state intervention based on its parens patriae power into the family setting
and the lives of children. Simple assertions of state intentions
to assist a child are an inadequate justification for such intervention. These limitations on state intervention have reaffirmed and perhaps strengthened the traditional notion that
parents are primarily responsible for their children.
To recognize, however, that notions of parental authority
and family privacy carefully circumscribe the state's parens patriae power does not mean that parental decisions in child rearing matters require blind deference and support in the law on
the assumption that they either promote children's interests or
strengthen the social fabric. The evolution of the parens patriae doctrine demonstrates the fallacy of such presumptions.
Despite state willingness to reinforce parental decision making
rights through devices such as parental consent and notification statutes, any underlying assumptions concerning protection of children and their best interests may not conform with
reality. Additionally, a child's constitutional claim to individual
rights underscores the necessity of critically examining the interests involved in the parent-child relationship. These considerations compel a careful assessment of the interests of the
child and the parent and of their interests in family privacy and
integrity.
Although a variety of state interests may support legislation circumscribing a minor child's privacy through mandatory
parental involvement requirements, these interests will often
collide with each other. Whenever notification or consent requirements mandate parental involvement, conflict between
the parent and child portending severe disruption of the family
223. See Dixon v. Attorney Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966, 972 (M.D. Pa. 1971); State
ex rel Hawks v. Lazaro, 157 W. Va. 417, 432, 202 S.E.2d 109, 120 (1974).
224. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 605 (1979); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418, 426 (1979).
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is likely. Although such legislation may augment parental authority, it does not advance the additional interests of family
privacy and harmony. As a result, while a child may legitimately claim some degree of constitutional protection, state reinforcement of parental authority as a principal legislative goal
may not adequately justify the individual and familial discord
which it is likely to generate. And similar to the state's presumptions about the parens patriae power, state reliance upon
presumptions of youthful incapacity and vulnerability may also
prove unfounded. On the other hand, when important health or
safety goals underlie a legislative judgment, and a requirement
of parental involvement clearly promotes them, the state's goal
may withstand a contrary claim by a child. Invalidation of any
such state legislation, however, ultimately depends upon the
Court's willingness to scrutinize carefully the affected interests.
This scrutiny requires some framework for judicial review.
IV. BALANCING THE INTERESTS
Using due process principles, the Court has taken two distinctly different approaches to resolving minors' claims to constitutional privacy protection. In Carey v. Population Services
International,Justice Brennan, in his plurality opinion, applied
traditional due process jurisprudence and asserted that intermediate scrutiny required the state to demonstrate an important interest along with narrowly tailored means in order to
overcome a child's privacy right.225 In a similar manner, the
Court in H.L. v. Matheson used an ends-means due process
226
analysis, although apparently at a reduced level of scrutiny.
On the other hand, Justice Powell in Bellotti v. Baird, also writing for a plurality, adopted an alternative balancing approach
and argued that the Court must delicately and sensitively
weigh the interests of the child against the countervailing interests of the state and, by necessity, those of the parents. 227 Although both approaches involve balancing the child's interests
against those of the state, the Bellotti formulation, advocating
judicial sensitivity in assessing all of the affected interests, represents a flexible approach to accommodating the conflicting
rights of the parent and child, but only if courts are also willing
to examine critically legislative presumptions underlying the
225. See notes 61-70 supra and accompanying text.
226. See notes 105-13 supra and accompanying text.
227. See notes 78-92 supra and accompanying text.
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statutory policies.22 8
It is this Article's position that meticulous and careful application of a Bellotti-type balancing analysis is the preferable
approach to resolving a minor's constitutional privacy claim. 22 9
This approach avoids the risk of unduly rigidified constitutional
doctrine in this difficult area. If the interests are clearly specified and valued, this approach should provide sufficient guidance to lower courts in resolving similar claims. A further
inquiry, however, into the nature of the interests held by the
child, the parents, and the state, and the degree to which they
conflict or harmonize with each other, is critical to the application of this approach. This section proposes a balancing analysis which properly appraises each of these interests.

A. THE CHMD'S

INTEREST

An examination of the child's interests requires an initial
determination of whether to recognize a constitutional privacy
right. Although the Court has delineated the basic parameters
of the privacy right for adults, it has not done so for minors.
Only in the case of abortion has a majority explicitly recog23 0
nized that a minor may assert a constitutional privacy claim.
The Court in Carey suggests that a privacy right may exist with
respect to a minor's decisions regarding the use of contraceptives, but it is questionable whether this view could command a
majority of the Court.231 In any event, recognition of a minor's
228. Cf. Disanto & Podolski, The Right to Privacy and TrilateralBalancingImplicationsfor the Family, 13 FAM. L. Q. 183, 210 (1979) (arguing for judicial
review of legislative presumptions underlying statutes designed for child's best
interests).
It is fair to argue that the suggested balancing approach with a careful examination of underlying presumptions is equivalent to the heightened means
scrutiny advocated by Justice Brennan in Carey. Given the Court's two-tier
formulation of ends-means scrutiny in the equal protection area, a balancing
approach, however, seems to create some additional flexibility which is not necessarily evident when the Court applies heightened or traditional scrutiny. See
Developments, supra note 1, at 1193-97.
229. In arguing that the Bellotti formulation represents the most workable

approach to the constitutional issue posed in a parent-child conflict involving
the minor child's privacy rights, this Article does not take the position that the
Bellotti result was correct. On the contrary, the Bellotti requirement of judicial
involvement seems unwarranted and unworkable unless the minor child's
abortion decision seriously threatens her welfare. See notes 267-72 infra and
accompanying text.

230. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642-44 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
231. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977). But see id.
at 702-03 (White, J., concurring); id. at 713 (Stevens, J., concurring). But cf.

Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 471 n.8 (1981)
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privacy right to make childbearing decisions is consistent with
privacy claims upheld on behalf of adults and involves no extension of existing privacy doctrine.232 The Court does not,
however, regard a child's privacy rights as coextensive with
those of an adult.
The test articulated by Justice Stevens in Whalen v. Roe,233
combined with the concerns of Justice Powell in Bellotti v.
Baird,234 offers a useful model for measuring the extent of a
child's privacy right, as well as a workable formulation of it for
balancing purposes. Under this approach a court would determine a child's privacy right based on whether he or she confronts a fundamental and critically important matter which
threatens grave and enduring consequences, necessitating
prompt decision making and action. The essential features of
this privacy formulation are the seriousness of the matter facing the child, its potential consequences, and the importance of
timeliness in resolving it. Under this interpretation, a privacy
right would assure children autonomy in reaching and implementing their decisions as well as protection against disclosure
to others, including their parents. Although this formulation
may be criticized as too broad, the Court could easily confine it
within the parameters of privacy available to adults. As defined, privacy would clearly not apply to the myriad of daily
matters faced by a child, such as bedtime or curfew, dating,
drinking, or smoking habits. Instead, it would properly implicate matters such as childbearing and vital medical treatment
decisions which the courts have traditionally regarded as
within the ambit of privacy for adults.235 This approach would
(plurality opinion) (suggesting that state can make sexual activity involving

minors a crime); id. at 482-83 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (state may control
problem of teenage pregnancy at its inception through criminal statutory rape
law).
232. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Eisenstadt v. Baird 405
U.S. 438 (1972) with Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) and
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
233. See notes 42-45 supra and accompanying text.
234. See notes 81-89 supra and accompanying text.
235. Privacy claims by a minor concerning decisions involving sterilization,
marriage, and school or church attendance are somewhat more troublesome. A
sterilization decision is similar to an abortion or contraception decision-it involves childbearing considerations, and the child can effectively conceal the decision from parents or others. Although important long-term consequences
obviously flow from a minor's sterilization decision, it is not clear that timeliness is a critical factor in the decision unless the child would experience serious physical or psychological harm. A minor might be able to postpone the
sterilization decision until he or she has reached the age of majority, and
thereby not immediately face the prospect of permanently and dramatically altering his or her life. But see Note, Sexual Privacy: Access of a Minor to Con-
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enable the courts on a case by case basis to identify matters
which are fundamentally important for a child and thereby
warrant constitutional scrutiny, much as the doctrine of privacy
has evolved in other contexts.
In addition to their interest in individual privacy, children
have an interest in family privacy. One aspect of constitutional
doctrine established by the Court in the Meyer-Pierce line of
cases is the interest of the family in avoiding unnecessary state
intervention into its affairs. 236 Both as an individual and as a
member of the family, a child certainly has a substantial interest in avoiding unjustified state intrusion into the family domain. Such state intrusion may threaten not only the child's
individual privacy interest, but also the integrity and stability
237
of the family as an institution.
traceptives, Abortion, and Sterilization Without ParentalConsent, 12 U. RICH.
L. REV. 221, 238-44 (1977). Even if the Court placed sterilization decisions
within the ambit of constitutional privacy protection for a minor, he or she
would most likely consult with a physician before reaching a final decision, following a procedure similar to that followed before an abortion or other critical
medical treatment decisions. See text accompanying notes 146-55 supra.
Although a marriage decision also implicates a right which the Court has
recognized as fundamental in the case of an adult, Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 383-84 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), it is not a decision a
minor ordinarily must make promptly. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642
(1979). Furthermore, it is unlikely that the child could avoid parental knowledge of the decision; therefore, concern over disruption of the parent-child relationship through disclosure is not as great in this context as in the abortion or
medical treatment context. And it is evident that the marriage itself would effectively terminate, or at least substantially alter, the immediate parent-child
relationship. Thus, the interest analysis proposed in this Article is not directly
applicable to this situation. Nevertheless, if the interests of child, parent, and
state were balanced, it is not clear that the importance of the decision to the
child would outweigh other parental interests. See Note, The Constitutionality
of ParentalConsentRequirements in Minor Marriages,12 U. CAL. D. L. REV. 301
(1979).
Similarly, when the question is whether the court should accord privacy
protection to assure a child's autonomy in deciding which school or church to
attend, the court can anticipate parental knowledge of the matter and its consequent effect on the family, thus obviating the need for application of the interest analysis presented in this Article. It can be argued, however, that these
decisions have fundamental long-term importance for the child and, if the child
does not reach them with some dispatch, they could have a lasting effect on the
child's development. Although the interest analysis would not directly apply,
the importance of the matter to the child could justify a result which recognized autonomy for the child in these matters if the court balanced his or her
interests against those of the parents and the state. See Developments, supra
note 1, at 1382. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241 (1972) (Douglas,
J., dissenting in part).
236. See text accompanying notes 163-74 supra.
237. See Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 794 (5th Cir. 1975), affd mem. sub
nom. Gerstein v. Coe, 428 U.S. 901 (1976); BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra
note 19, at 5.
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A child also has an interest in receiving guidance, assistance, and support when confronted with important personal
matters. Parental assistance in these situations is certainly the
norm, and it is consistent with the traditionally exercised and
constitutionally recognized role of the parent.238 From the
child's perspective, parental guidance throughout childhood
may be critical in assuring that the child develops into a mature, capable adult.23 9 Without parental support and guidance,
the child may lack adequate insight and strength to confront
responsibly and to resolve satisfactorily a personal matter as
important as whether or not to bear a child. Although alternative sources of guidance or decision making authority may be
available to the child, it is far from certain that they can provide the same degree of sensitivity, insight, or concern to the
resolution of the matter that a parent would likely offer. Commentators have condemned the notion that the government
should intervene as a decision maker for the child or as a sub240
stitute for the parents in these circumstances.
To recognize that state intervention or professional consultation in lieu of parental consultation are not necessarily satisfactory alternatives is not to suggest, however, that parental
authority must prevail. Children's need for parental guidance
largely depends on the extent of their maturity and ability to
care independently for themselves. 24 ' The nature of most constitutional privacy claims asserted by children, which generally
involve claims of independence in reaching decisions concerning sexual activity, contraception, and abortion, usually means
that older and somewhat more sophisticated adolescents are
the claimants. Thus, frequently it is a mature or relatively mature adolescent who is asserting an independent decision mak238. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637-39 (1979); Garvey, supra note 1, at

821.
239. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638-39; Hafen, supra note 1, at 657.
240. See BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 19, at 13; Watson, supra
note 1, at 669.
241. The age at which children can reliably and capably make informed decisions in an adult manner has not yet been established. Recent research indicates that children over the age of 15 are as capable as adults at making
medical and psychological treatment decisions, while children under age 11 do
not generally provide adult-like reasons for their decisions. Children between
the ages of 11 to 14 seem to differ individually in terms of their ability to decide
these matters. See Grisso & Vierling, Minors' Consent to Treatment: A Developmental Perspective, 9 PROFESSIONAL PSYCH. 412 (1978); Melton, Psychological
Issues in Juveniles' Competency to Waive Their Rights, 10 J. CINIcAL CHILD
PSYCH. 59 (1981). Other research supports the conclusion that most children
achieve an adult's ability to reach important decisions between the ages of 12
and 14. See, e.g., J. PIAGET, THE MORAL JumGmENT OF THE CmI
(1932).
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ing claim. In this case, the argument that parental consultation
or involvement furthers the child's interests loses much of its
persuasive force. Even then, however, parental assistance can
be critical in helping the child through the difficult decision and
in supporting the child afterwards. The support, warmth, and
concern of a parent can certainly be as important to the mature
child as to the immature child, and most parents willingly fulfill
this role. The facilitation and encouragement of parent-child
interchange in these circumstances furthers the state's interest
in promoting the child's welfare.
Parental involvement, however, presupposes familial harmony and stability between parent and child. This premise,
unfortunately, does not reliably or accurately reflect actual parent-child relationships, which all too frequently exist or emerge
when a teenager faces the difficult decisions arising from sexual activity.242 If discord and distrust characterize the family

relationship between parent and child, it is unlikely that the
child will receive much concerned, sensitive guidance from his
or her parents. The parents' own interests or moral values are
likely to influence their counseling or decision making, perhaps
in a manner clearly detrimental to the child.243 Thus, when a

mature minor, or a minor confronted with a hostile, unstable
family environment, advances a privacy claim, the child's interests will not necessarily involve parental participation in the
matter.
B.

THE PARENTAL INTEREST

Our cultural history and constitutional tradition greatly
value the parental interest in a child.244 Since its decision in
Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court has firmly established as constitutional doctrine that parents, not the state, are principally responsible for raising and educating their children. 245 The
Meyer principle has evolved into a fundamental right entitled
to stringent due process protection as an aspect of the privacy
doctrine.246 No comprehensive definition of this parental right
242. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 437 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 794 (5th Cir. 1975), affd mem sub nom Gerstein

V. Coe, 428 U.S. 901 (1976).
243. See Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997, 1001 (Mass. 1978); State v.
Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 908, 530 P.2d 260, 265 (1975).
244. See generally Hafen, supra note 1.
245. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968). See also notes
163-74 supra and accompanying text.
246. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-33 (1972).
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has emerged. Instead, the Court seems content to allow the parameters of the concept to emerge case by case. But the parental child rearing right is not absolute. It is subject to state
regulation in narrowly drawn circumstances. 247 Paramount
rights of the child can also overcome conflicting parental
248
interests.
The parental role in raising a child initially involves the
parent in nurturing and protecting, and later in guiding and educating the child toward the ultimate goal of the child's independence and assumption of the responsibilities of
adulthood.249 In fulfilling this role, parents usually derive satisfaction from sharing their beliefs and values with the child and
in observing the child's absorption of them into his or her own
set of values. 250 This satisfaction and the fact of having produced offspring will often contribute to an adult's sense of immortality. Moreover, the love and companionship shared
between parent and child can be a source of happiness and satisfaction.251 Sharing and participating in a child's growth and
development can generate a deep sense of satisfaction and a
feeling of importance in the parent. Without further cataloguing all of the aspects of parenthood, it is reasonable to conclude
that considerable personal and psychological satisfactions,
many intangible, accrue to individuals who assume the parental role. Parents clearly have a substantial interest in realizing
some or all of these benefits of parenthood.
The parental interest also embraces the notion of parental
responsibility for the child during the period of childhood. In a
sense this responsibility naturally evolves out of childhood itself, because children, particularly during their infancy and
younger years, are unable to care adequately for themselves.
247. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-71 (1944).
248. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 639-44 (1979); Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72-75 (1976). Cf. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs.,
101 S. Ct. 2153, 2161-62 (1981) (state interests supersede parental interests to

the extent that the Constitution does not require appointment of counsel for an
indigent parent facing termination of parental rights proceedings).

249. The parent-child relationship is an evolutionary one-one that changes
as the child grows and matures into a capable individual. Thus, the individual
interests of the parent and child can be expected to shift over the course of
time. For a more extensive treatment of the parental role and interests in child
rearing, see J. GOLDSTEmN, A. FREuND & A. SoL=r, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS
OF TEE CmLD 9-28 (1973); Hafen, supra note 1, at 613-30; Watson, supra note 1,
at 662-67.
250. See Watson, supra note 1, at 663-66; Developments, supra note 1, at

1353.
251. See Watson, supra note 1, at 663-66; Developments, supra note 1, at
1353-54.
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Although it might be argued that the degree of parental responsibility recedes as the child matures and is better able to care
for himself or herself, the law recognizes a continuing parental
responsibility and a corresponding liability until the child
reaches adulthood or is otherwise emancipated. 252 As a quid
pro quo to these responsibilities of parenthood, parents have
authority over their children. Recognition of parental authority
is also consistent with the guidance and educational functions
of parenthood. Thus, because parents are responsible for their
children, they have an interest in governmental recognition and
253
support of their authority in raising their children.
C.

THE FAMY INTEREST

In articulating the potentially conflicting interests of child
and parent, it becomes apparent that the structure of their relationship as reflected in the family unit is important in avoiding
or resolving individual problems. Just as the Court has
ascribed constitutional rights to individual family members, it
has recognized that the family itself is an institution entitled to
due process protection. 254 In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
the Court recognized the importance of the family unit to its individual members, parent and child alike, and the need to mini-

mize state intrusion into the

unit.255

In the family, the interests

of parent and child coalesce as they interact. The family nurtures and directs the child as he or she matures, and the child
relies on family members, primarily parents, but also siblings
and others, for affection, guidance, and support. Since they are
principally responsible for the family, parents retain considerable authority over the family. But because the family supports
and enhances the mutual interests of both child and parent, the
family as a unit is critical to assuring maintenance of the reciprocal relationships and, thus, the fulfillment of the individual
256
interests of each member.
Since the family relationship is important to child and parent, rupture of that relationship is likely to be detrimental to
the interests of both. With the bonds of the family broken, a
252. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.1 (West Supp. 1980) (parents liable for
minor child's willful misconduct); CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS §§ 28, 43 (1954).
See also Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 974 (1973).
253. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638-39 (1979); Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
254. See notes 179-86 supra and accompanying text.
255. See notes 181-86 supra and accompanying text.
256. See generally BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 19, at 3-14.
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child is unable to turn to the parents as a source of guidance
and support in confronting difficult matters. When a child has
broken away from his or her parents, the parents will similarly
find themselves unable to offer assistance despite their best intentions. Whether the ruptured relationship is the result of the
child's recalcitrance, parental overreaching, or both, a nonfunctioning family institution frustrates at least to some extent the
interests of the parent and child.257 Rupture may also lead to a

substantial likelihood of state intrusion into the family.
The state has an interest in establishing threshold standards defining a child's legal competence as part of its larger
scheme of legal relationships among citizens. But blind adherence to these somewhat arbitrary standards 258 for the purpose
of defining the constitutional rights of parent and child proves
unsatisfactory, because they do not accommodate the variety of
relationships and internal dynamics found in family patterns.259 Indeed, state involvement in the parent-child relation257. A nonfunctioning family institution is one in which parent-child interaction no longer occurs in any meaningful fashion. This does not include a
family unit in which some degree of friction or tension between the parent and
child exists, because this type of relationship is not atypical of families with adolescent children. See R LERNER & G. SPA'ma, AnOLEscENT DEVELOPMENT 55
(1980); D. ROGERS, ADOLESCENTS & YouTH, 225 (4th ed. 1981).
258. Statutes governing the emancipation of children reflect the arbitrariness of state standards. Prior to 1971, when the states ratified the twenty-sixth
amendment lowering the voting age to eighteen, five states specified that females achieved adulthood at age eighteen, while males achieved it at age
twenty-one. See Katz, Schroeder & Sidman, EmancipatingOur Children-Coming of Legal Age in America, 7 F m. L. Q. 211, 213 n.16 (1973). Since the passage of the twenty-sixth amendment, all states have lowered their age of
majority to either eighteen or nineteen, with no disparity between males and
females. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975). Some states, however, continue to distinguish between adolescents by age for various purposes. Compare Mss. CODE ANN. § 93-19-13 (1980) (minor 18 years old may contract in
matters affecting personal property) with MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-1-5(b) (1973)
(minor must be over 21 years old to marry without parental or judicial
consent).
259. No two families operate precisely alike. Not only does the degree of
authority exercised by parents over their children, particularly adolescents,

vary widely, M. BERZONSY, ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT 304-16 (1981), but also
the degree of autonomy sought by children as they mature, as well as the extent of parental acquiescence, differs considerably among families. Likewise,
many adolescents are sufficiently mature well before the age of majority to care
adequately for themselves, while others are dependent upon their parents well
beyond the age of legal emancipation. D. ROGERS, supra note 257, at 225. Thus,
despite legal presumptions establishing arbitrary age emancipation standards,
the reality of many family relationships conflicts with such blanket standards.
But see H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 424-25 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(asserting that state-mandated parental notification requirements based upon
the child's age in the case of a minor child seeking an abortion are constitutionally permissible regardless of the minor's maturity or emancipation status,
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ship through mandatory parental consent or notification
requirements endangers the interests of individual family
members and of the family itself. State intervention of this nature may undermine whatever rapport exists between parent
and child, and may finally rupture an already tenuous relationship. This is ultimately inconsistent with the interests of both
parent and child, and with the state's primary interest in assuring and maintaining a relatively harmonious, stable, and ongoing family environment. 2 60 In this setting parent-child
consultation can be expected to ensue naturally, thus providing
the child with parental assistance in critical decisions facing
the child. But when the necessary rapport is missing to encourage this shared dialogue and decision making, state-mandated parental involvement will accomplish little other than to
26
guarantee the final rupture. 1
On the other hand, state neutrality on the issue of parental
consent or notification in matters affecting a child's privacy
rights prevents unnecessary state intrusion into family affairs.
It enables family members to resolve matters themselves in a
fashion consistent with their ongoing relationship, past experience, and perceived interests. Although this may occasionally
mean that a child will choose to avoid parental involvement in
an important matter, the child will not face the prospect of disrupting the family by confrontation with his or her parents.
Likewise, the child who is mature enough to resolve the matter
independently does not face the prospect of undue parental
pressure or overreaching which may, in the child's mind, detrimentally affect the decision or unnecessarily strain the family
even though such a requirement is imprecise or unjust in individual cases). It
is precisely this sort of gross overgeneralization and the resulting inequities
that a careful balancing analysis can avoid in the case of a minor asserting a
legitimate privacy claim. When a statute implicates an interest as important as

a privacy right, it is appropriate for the courts to examine the presumptions underlying arbitrary age guidelines. See generally Tribe, supra note 206, at 8.
260. See BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 19, at 3-14.
261. It has been argued that parent-child confrontation over the issue of a
minor child's pregnancy is desirable in order to assure family continuity and to
enable parents and children to explore their individual and collective problems.
Watson, supra note 1, at 670. In many instances, however, this confrontation is
likely to destroy the family unit, which both Professor Watson and this author
highly value. Professor Watson recognizes this and argues that a minor child
who is prepared to assume adult status should be entitled to avoid parental disclosure of her pregnancy and abortion decision. Id. There will be instances,
however, when disclosure would dislocate family relationships to the ultimate
disadvantage of the child who otherwise needs and benefits from the family. In
this situation the child also should be able to avoid disclosure. Such an approach would most likely assure family continuity, in one form or another,
more consistently than the Watson approach.
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relationship.2 6 2 After resolving the matter, the child can anticipate remaining within the family and securing the benefits of
that relationship. Diminishing the prospect of conflict or confrontation reinforces the stability of the family and assures its
availability as a source of support for the child. A long-term result of this approach is that the state can expect to strengthen
the family institution and to enhance the family's role in child
rearing.
State neutrality on the question of parental involvement in
a child's important personal decisions affecting areas of privacy
does not mean that parent-child consultation and resolution of
critical matters facing the child is inappropriate. On the contrary, consultation is preferable, because it enables the child to
request assistance from the parents, and it involves the parent
in intimate aspects of the child's life. But the state should not
mandate this involvement at the possible expense of the family
itself, or at the child's expense in terms of the severe future
consequences. A more flexible state statutory approach that
encourages rather than compels parental involvement presents
a feasible solution which can accommodate the various interests of child and parent.2 63 Such an approach is also consistent
with the flexibility generally inherent in domestic relations
statutes that have successfully accommodated conflicting familial interests.

264

262. But see H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 425 n.2 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens asserts that the mature or emancipated minor should
be capable of withstanding whatever parental pressure might occur following
their notification of her abortion decision. Id. Although this may be true, it ignores the important state interest in continued maintenance of the family unit.
A mandatory parental notification statute in the case of a minor seeking an
abortion will foster unnecessary family conflict, and it will very likely undermine the family structure and, ultimately, the interests of the family members.
263. Cf. Disanto & Podolski, supra note 228, at 210 (arguing that mandatory
statutory means are not well suited for achieving the best interests of the child,
and that courts should be prepared to create exceptions to such statutes or to
void the entire statute).
264. Most state statutes providing for custody in the case of divorce direct
the court to consider the child's best interests. See, e.g., CAI. CiVIL CODE § 4600
(West 1980) (wishes of the child must be considered in making child custody
award); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 602 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (determination of "best
interests" of child in child custody action involve consideration of both parents'
and child's wishes); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 722.23 (West 1980) (interests of
parents and preference of child must be considered in making child custody
award); MiNN. STAT. § 518.17 (1980) (child's and parents' interests considered in
determining child's "best interest").
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D. THE STATE'S INTEREST
To argue that state intrusion into the parent-child relationship, when the child might legitimately maintain a privacy
claim, is counterproductive in furthering the interests of both
parent and child in the family relationship, is not to assert that
the state should never intervene between parent and child.
Courts have consistently recognized that state health and
safety objectives are sufficiently compelling to justify intervention in certain circumstances. 26 When the state purports to
protect legislatively the health or safety of children by mandating parental involvement in areas affecting the child's privacy,
the courts should require the state to demonstrate that parental disclosure is essential to its legislative objective. 266 This requirement is consistent with an overall balancing approach,
because even health and safety statutes can strain the individual relationships of family members and the family itself. Absent a clear counterbalancing benefit to the child, statemandated disclosure should trigger the same interest analysis
that would be triggered if the state had simply sought to reinforce parental authority.
The state may also have a sufficiently strong interest to justify intervention in those situations in which an immature minor claims constitutional privacy protection to preclude
parental involvement in an important personal matter. Relying
principally upon a parens patriae rationale, the state can assert
an interest in protecting the immature child from the consequences of a decision which the child is purportedly incapable
of reaching in a mature, rational manner. To accomplish its objective, the state might conclude that the matter requires parental consultation. Of course, this intervention poses the
same danger to the family relationship as it has for a mature
minor, particularly if the child faces a hostile family environment. It was this concern in Bellotti which led Justice Powell
265. See notes 198-206 supra and accompanying text.
266. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 442-45 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissentig). Justice Marshall convincingly refutes the majority's argument that parental notification of a minor's abortion decision serves state health concerns by
demonstrating that the statute does not require parents to transmit pertinent

health information about the child to the treating physician. It is notable that
the majority in Matheson seemingly excluded the emergency abortion situation
from the parental notification requirement. 450 U.S. at 407 n14. The exclusion
suggests that courts should not blindly defer to a purported legislative health
goal implemented through a parental involvement requirement, but that they

should recognize exceptions to mandatory notification or consent requirements. See Disanto &Podolski, supra note 228, at 210.
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to require the alternative avenue of judicial review and approval in the case of an immature minor seeking an abortion. 267
A host of administrative problems, however, accompany the
Bellotti scheme. 268 And in the case of abortion and other medically related decisions affecting a minor's privacy rights, it overlooks the important role played by the child's physician.
Notably, the Court was willing to defer to medical judgment in
Parhamv. J.R., a case in which the child faced commitment to
2 69
a mental health institution.
Compelling arguments support similar deference in abortion and related privacy contexts in the case of an immature
child. Even for the immature child, there is no right or wrong
abortion decision which the state can expect her to reach. The
Court has required state neutrality on the morality of abortion;270 thus, highly subjective factors concerning immediate
and long-term consequences which are unique to the child will
dictate the decision. Given the extremely personal nature and
consequences of the decision, it is doubtful that compelled parental or judicial involvement in the matter will substantially
enlighten the child's decision, particularly when she has already received medical and possibly other consultation on the
matter.2 71
267. See notes 86-89 supra and accompanying text.
268. 443 U.S. at 655 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also Wynn v. Carey, 582
F.2d 1375, 1388-89 (7th Cir. 1978).
269. See notes 129-38 supra and accompanying text.
270. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 655 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("It is inherent in the right to make the abortion decision that the right may be
exercised without public scrutiny and in defiance of the contrary opinion of the
sovereign or other third parties."). Moreover, it should be noted that no one
can compel either a mature or immature pregnant minor to submit to an abortion against her wishes. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 73-74
(1976). But cf. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (state may deny funds for nontherapeutic abortions while funding childbirth medical services); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (Congress can constitutionally refuse to fund
therapeutic abortions even though it funds childbirth services through medicaid program).
271. The Court has held that "the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must
rest with the physician." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973). Additionally,
the Court has indicated that the physician's medical judgment in the abortion
context should properly reflect consideration of the additional factors of the
woman's physical, emotional, psychological, and familial situation. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973). Thus, the minor child may reasonably expect to
receive counseling on her abortion decision from the doctor or from others responsible for counseling pregnant patients at the hospital or clinic. See Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1181-82
(N.D. Ohio 1979); Note, supra note 187, at 1238-41. Cf. Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d
1162, 1163-64 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 829 (1981) (describing the
counseling sessions at a state family planning center preliminary to the distri-
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The Court's willingness to defer to medical judgment in the
Parham case suggests an alternative solution which minimizes
judicial involvement and its accompanying administrative difficulties, and reduces potential family discord resulting from
compelled disclosure. The state should defer to the decision
reached by the child and the child's physician, but the physician or another individual counseling the child should be able
to invoke judicial review in those cases in which the decision
seriously threatens the child's welfare. 272 Such an approach is
ultimately consistent with the state's parens patriae role, because its interest is in protecting the child's welfare, not in
judging the quality of an abortion decision. This approach also
adequately protects the immature child without unduly hampering a mature minor in the exercise of his or her privacy
rights. In addition, nothing precludes the child, the physician,
or the court, if its review is eventually invoked, from consultation with the parents if that is consistent with the immature
child's best interests. By restricting the state's intrusion into
the child's privacy, and into the family in the case of an immature minor, this approach reconciles the interests of the child,
parents, and state in a manner consistent with the foregoing
analysis and the principles of family autonomy and integrity.
The state's interest in intervention into the parent-child relationship, through consent or notification statutes regulating
areas in which a child might claim privacy protection, seems
more tenuous in those situations in which the state bases its
involvement upon welfare or morality objectives. Although
bution of contraceptives to minors). There is nothing to preclude a state from
statutorily establishing informed consent requirements regulating the abortion
procedure for minors or, for that matter, regulating other important medical
treatment decisions for a minor. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
67 (1976); Women's Community Health Center, Inc. v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542,
549-50 (D. Me. 1979). But see Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91-92
n.2 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring), cited in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640-41
(1979) (describing the operation of an abortion clinic and the limited role
played by the physician in counseling the abortion patient).
272. In this case, judicial review would closely resemble the review set forth
in Bellotti. The court would have to assess whether the minor was competent
to reach an individual decision and whether it served the child's best interestmatters with which the court should have some familiarity from its experience
in custody, guardianship, and similar proceedings. One apparent advantage to
this scheme over the Bellotti judicial alternative is that the doctor, a capable
and sophisticated professional, is responsible for initiating judicial proceedings,
rather than the child. A physician, or a social welfare agency if one is consulted, is in a better position to commence and to oversee litigation than the
allegedly immature minor child. Cf. Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375, 1388-89 (7th
Cir. 1978) (minor can expect administrative difficulty if required to initiate litigation in order to secure an abortion).
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state courts have broadly defined state power to legislate in
these areas, the Supreme Court has carefully looked at the
means chosen by the state to accomplish its objectives. 27 3 Welfare or morality-based legislation compelling parental disclosure or consent rests upon the critical presumption that it will
enhance the interests of both parent and child. But under care27 4
ful analysis, this presumption often proves to be fallacious.
For instance, disclosure to parents of a minor child's sexual activity or pregnancy may threaten the vital family relationship
in a manner inconsistent with the interests of parent and
child.275 Because balancing the interests of parent, child, and
state requires sensitivity and care, legislation predicated upon
erroneous generalizations concerning the individual or the family does not satisfy the constitutional standard. In situations
touching upon the privacy interests of minors, therefore, the
states must carefully draft legislation directed at accomplishing
welfare or morality goals in order to avoid gross presumptions
which may prove less than universally true.

E. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Thus far the analysis has focused upon the interests of the
child, the parents, the family, and the state; however, the Court
has also indicated that in evaluating constitutional claims it
gives consideration to the extent of the burden imposed upon
the exercise of a constitutional right. This approach is reflected
most clearly in the recent abortion funding decisions in which
the Court concluded that the government's refusal to fund
abortions for poor women was not an unconstitutional burden
upon their exercise of a fundamental right.276 Justice Stevens
in H.L. v. Matheson similarly implied that in the abortion context a parental notification requirement represented a less substantial burden upon a pregnant minor's privacy right than a
273. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694-99 (1977). See text accompanying notes 207-13 supra.
274. See text accompanying notes 211-13 supra.
275. See text accompanying note 260 supra. See, e.g., Women's Community
Health Center, Inc. v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542, 548 (D. Me. 1979); State v.
Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 907-08, 530 P.2d 260, 265 (1975).
276. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980) (Congress has not unduly
infringed fundamental right); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977) (state
does not directly infringe upon exercise of a fundamental right). Cf. Sosna v.
Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 406, 410 (1975) (state's one year residency requirement as
prerequisite to divorce does not irretrievably foreclose divorce petitioner from
relief she desires and thus does not infringe her fundamental right to travel).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:459

parental consent requirement. 277 Although this may suggest
that a court should separately evaluate parental notification requirements and consent requirements for constitutional privcy purposes, such a result ignores the Court's assertion in
Whalen v. Roe that the Constitution protects important individual matters from unjustifiable disclosure. Additionally, application of the suggested interest analysis is not dependent upon
whether a consent or notification requirement invokes parental
involvement. It is the existence of such involvement and its
possible threat to family integrity which are important in
weighing the respective interests. 278 Therefore, regardless of
whether the state becomes involved in the parent-child relationship through a notification or consent requirement, the
court should balance the respective interests by using the analysis previously suggested.
Upon completion of the balancing process, the question remains whether the court should give a saving construction to a
challenged parental consent or notification statute. Although
courts might save unduly broad statutory prescriptions of parental involvement by creating exceptions for various classes of
279
children, as the court impliedly did in the Matheson case,
they should invalidate the entire statute in order to encourage
the requisite legislative care in drafting. This recommendation
is consistent with the value which the court has placed on the
privacy right, even in the case of children. The analytical underpinnings of this approach can be traced to the first amendment overbreadth doctrine. An overbroad statute tends to chill
speech in much the same manner as a parental involvement
statute deters minors from exercising their privacy rights.280
Because of the practical problems a minor encounters merely
to initiate litigation on a privacy issue, the courts should proceed to consider the merits of a facial constitutional challenge
when the child has properly met basic justiciability requirements. 28 1 Otherwise courts will be frustrated in their efforts to
277. 450 U.S. at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring). See notes 116-18 supra and accompanying text.
278. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 648 (1979).
279. The Court's ruling apparently excludes emancipated minors, demonstrably mature minors, minors facing an emergency medical situation, and minors with hostile home situations. 450 U.S. at 405-07.
280. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 427-28 n.2. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
For a general description of the overbreadth doctrine and its evolution, see generally G. GUinrER, supra note 1, at 1185-95; L. TRIE, supra note 41, at 710-18.
281. This argument is consistent with overbreadth doctrine, since courts
can expect minors, because of their inexperience, timidity, or lack of resources,
frequently to be deterred from seeking judicial resolution of a privacy claim.
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resolve definitively these important and most likely recurring
privacy questions. Moreover, the suggested interest analysis
does not vary significantly between classes of children, because
the individual and family interests are likely to be relatively
constant. The court, therefore, should be able to decide the
constitutional questions presented in a facial statutory challenge without great difficulty.
V.

CONCLUSION

The conclusion that emerges from the foregoing valuation
and balancing of interests is that children should be entitled to
claim a degree of constitutional protection under the privacy
doctrine to assure them autonomy in their decision making,
even from their parents. Although this conclusion departs from
traditional social values recognizing parental control in all matters concerning their children, it finds limited support in the
Supreme Court's recent decisions in the abortion area concerning pregnant minors and among various state statutory provisions extending limited autonomy to children in certain cases.
When a minor child faces a critically important life choice with
enduring consequences, either the child, the child's parents, or
the state must ultimately resolve the matter. The dynamics of
the family relationship will usually dictate a shared parentchild decision. When this is not possible, however, neither the
parents nor the state seem any better qualified than the affected individual-the child-to reach the final decision unless,
of course, the child is incapable of confronting the problem.
A constitutional privacy claim on behalf of a child arises
only if the state has interjected itself, through legislation or
other means, to restrict the child's freedom of action. Absent
state involvement, intrafamily conflict does not rise to the level
of a constitutional question; rather, individual family members
must resolve their problems among themselves. But even
when the state has legislatively mandated parental involvement through consent or notification requirements, the constitution only protects children's privacy when they must resolve
vitally important personal matters involving serious and enduring consequences and requiring prompt resolution. A privacy
right would assure a child's autonomy in reaching and impleCf. G. GuNTEiR, supra note 1, at 1187 (overbreadth is available in the first
amendment context to protect third parties who are not courageous enough to
initiate litigation on their own behalf).
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menting decisions and in protecting those decisions against disclosure to others, including his or her parents.
Once the court recognizes a privacy right, it then must
carefully assess the interests of child and parent individually
and as family members, as well as any justifications for the legislation proferred by the state. Absent compelling state health
or safety goals that only mandated parental involvement can
accomplish, the interest of the child in privacy, coupled with
the shared interests of parent and child in family privacy and
integrity, should prevail over contrary parental authority concerns. Indeed, the Court has consistently recognized, although
not as clearly or explicitly as it might have, the value of family
integrity and harmony in instances when conflict has loomed
between the parent and child. By properly recognizing the importance of this factor, it becomes clear that presumptions regarding youthful incapacity or parental benevolence are simply
too crude a basis for legislative linedrawing, especially when
the legislation affects the child's critical individual rights and
the institutional integrity of the family. But the state need not
face the prospect of individual determinations of a child's competency in each case, notwithstanding the Court's judicial review proposal in Bellotti. Since the essence of privacy is that
the child's decision controls absent a clear threat to his or her
welfare, state intervention is only justified under the parens patriae doctrine, and then only if the child's incapacity in decision
making threatens his or her well-being. Unless these conditions are present, the balance suggested in this Article would
preclude state-sanctioned parental or governmental intervention into the zone of privacy constitutionally extended to
children.

